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Introduction
This thesis was born as a tentative marriage of stochastic calculus and topos theory,
and developed into a ramified investigation on the logical aspects of the elementary
structures on which the former rests.
Work at the intersection between category theory and probability theory has been
done for a long time [Lawvere 1962; Giry 1982], though we are currently witnessing
surging interest in these questions, under the flagship of categorical probability theory.
Much has been done regarding foundational aspects of probability theory, either by
trying to develop a form of ‘synthetic probability theory’ [Simpson 2017; Fritz 2019] or
by investigating relevant categorical structures for probability theory [Fritz and Perrone
2019; Simpson 2012; Heunen et al. 2017].
We tried instead to apply the technique of internalization. This method simplifies a
mathematical theory by offsetting some of its complexity to the objects and arrows of a
suitably constructed topos. In fact, a topos E looks very much ‘set-like’ from the internal
point of view, i.e. if we adopt a suitable language interpreted in objects and arrows of E .
Everything one can express in higher-order intuitionistic logic, one can do it in a topos
as if it was the usual world of sets.
In fact, if we fix a topos E , there are now two levels of ‘mathematics’ relative to E : the
‘external’ one (on par with E and expressed using the metalanguage), and the ‘internal’
one (expressed using the internal language of E ). An automatic procedure can convert
any sentence or proof in the internal world into a sentence or proof in the external world.
In doing so, all the complexity hidden in the objects and arrows of E resurfaces, and
thus simple constructions and proofs are inflated to more convoluted ones, about more
complex objects. Borrowing an example from [Blechschmidt 2017], a commutative ring
defined in the sheaf topos of a topological site, once externalized becomes a sheaf of
commutative rings on that site.
The idea is to take advantage of the opposite procedure: given a complex theory T
i
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in the external world, we could try to offset its complexity by constructing an ad-hoc
topos E and a theory T′ expressible in the language of E such that the externalization of
T′ is the theory T we started with. If we succeed to do this, then every (intuitionistically
valid) proof we do in T′ can be translated automatically to a proof of T:
hard P about T simpler P′ about T′
proof of P in T proof of P′ in T′
to E
to Set
This idea is used, for example, in [Blechschmidt 2017] to investigate abelian sheaves and
thus algebraic geometry, reducing many tedious proofs to simpler and more conceptual
ones in commutative or even linear algebra.
In this thesis, we’re trying to attack stochastic calculus with this technique. The
question we’re trying to answer is: how much of stochastic calculus is ‘stochastic’ and
how much is ‘calculus’? Can we simplify the theory by hiding some of the stochasticity
in a suitable ‘topos of stochastic sets’?
To understand how this could be done, let us briefly recall what the central object of
stochastic calculus is: stochastic processes. In their most basic forms, they are collections
of random variables X = {Xt : Ω → Rn}t∈I , where I is a suitable set of ‘times’
(usually N or R+). Alternatively, they can be seen as mappings X : Ω → (Rn)I or
Ω× I → Rn. Intuitively, X should represent a ‘random map’ I → Rn. The picture is
vastly complicated by the fact each Xt is often required to satisfy a different measurability
condition, corresponding to the fact Ω is not actually fixed but ‘grows with time’ (one
says the process is adapted).
The first attempt we made at modelling this situation was to construct a category of
random mappings ‘with context’ by using the machinery of probability monads, the
Kleisli construction and generalized lens categories1 [Spivak 2019]. A category of random
mappings is what is proposed by [Lawvere 1962], as the Kleisli category of a suitable
monad on the category of measurable spaces, namely the one assigning to a space its set
of probability measures (this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2).
However, this line of attack didn’t prove successful, and it seemed hopeless to
capture adapted processes through this lens.
Therefore we tried to use an old construction by Scott originally emerged in the
setting of forcing in set theory [Scott 1967]. Essentially, he considered a Boolean-valued
1Generalized lens categories are basically a different point of view on the Grothendieck construction.
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model of set theory where the Boolean algebra of truth values is the complete Boolean
algebra one gets by quotienting a σ-field by its ideal of meager sets.
The idea of Scott can be recast in modern language using the categorical device
of triposes. Triposes are a categorical gadget which encode intuitionistic higher-order
theories as fibrations over a base category (whose objects will become the types of the
language), satisfying some coherence properties. Intuitively, the fiber over an object X
corresponds to the Heyting algebra of predicates over the type X.
Then, from a tripos, one can easily construct a topos by simply building sets in the
logic encoded by it. In our particular case, the result is a topos (which we named after
Scott) in which truth values are ‘essential events’ of the base space Ω. A proposition is
globally true if it holds with probability one. The internal objects of natural and real
numbers are natural and real valued random variables on Ω, respectively. To us, this
seems a good start for an internalization procedure.
The benefit of the tripos approach is that the logical content of the construction is
much more vivid. One directly encodes in a tripos what it means to have propositions
valued in events of Ω, and this carries over to the associated topos. We consider this
tool a powerful weapon in the arsenal of ‘internalizing mathematicians’, as they allow a
rather explicit control of the logical properties of the target topos.
To get to the point at which internalization seems within arm’s reach took us enough
time to prevent us from actually doing any non-trivial internal mathematics. Nonethe-
less, we consider our work valuable for two reasons:
1. As already said, it laid the groundwork for further investigations in the internal
mathematics of Scott topoi and their possible use in the conceptual simplification
of probability theory and stochastic calculus. In particular, we are confident many
arguments and ‘basic’ techniques in those areas can be given a compelling logical
interpretation in Scott topoi, thereby providing cleaner and more conceptual
proofs and constructions.
2. It uncovered (at least to the author) many links between stochastic calculus (and,
more generally, the study of non-deterministic dynamical systems) and modal
logic, which might be fruitful to both areas. Reflections upon this conclude this
work, in Appendix A.
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Contents
This master thesis consists of five chapters. The first two provide preliminary notions.
In Chapter 1 we laid the groundwork for later chapters by providing basic facts about
some algebraic structures for logic (mainly various flavours of lattices) and discussing
the kind of formal languages we are going to employ later, when discussing triposes.
Chapter 2 instead is a quick tour of measure theory and stochastic calculus, with some
categorical remarks.
Chapter 3 is a brief introduction to tripos theory. We give a detailed account of the
semantics of triposes, and their relationship with the topoi one constructs from them. It
should provide the reader with ‘off-the-shelf’ tools to interpret theories in a tripos and
its associated topos.
Chapter 4 discusses the so-called Scott triposes and their associated topoi. We give
their construction and analyze some properties. Functoriality of the construction is
discussed, and we end the chapter with some elementary examples of internalization,
plus a tentative internalization of stochastic processes in a Scott topos.
Chapter 5 explores the logical features of filtered probability spaces. We observe
there is a natural set of modalities one can adjoin to the internal language of the Scott
topos of Ω in order to be able to address the ‘dynamic’ aspect of its field of events.
The chapter ends with a discussion of some ideas regarding how to use these modal
operators to internalize measurability criteria.
Finally, Appendix A compares the modalities introduced in Chapter 5 to those
appearing in known process logics, and conclude they have a very different meaning,
which, however, we had no time to investigate further. We also discuss a possible link
between the semantics of process logics and filtered probability spaces.
Acknowledgements
O Captain! my Captain! our fearful trip is done,
The ship has weather’d every rack, the prize we sought is won,
The port is near, the bells I hear, the people all exulting
Walt Whitman
By this time in my mathematical career, it has become clear mathematics is an
essentially social endeavour. It is not possible to do mathematics alone, and it doesn’t
even make sense to do so: the very concept of proof entails having one human explaining
something to another. This is true whether we adopt a Platonist view on mathematics,
and it’s even more true if we don’t. Therefore it seems necessary to acknowledge here
the contribution of my social entourage, whose influence on me is directly expressed in
this work.
First and foremost, my family deserves the utmost gratitude for enabling me to
undertake this long journey. They have been the wind in my sails, for longer than I can
remember. Their sacrifice and love will inspire me for the rest of my life.
Second, my friends. They have been the crew escorting me in this perilous journey.
Their sole presence eased the fatigue of it all, warmed my heart and filled my life with
enthusiasm and joy, lifting the heavy weight mathematics sometimes can be.
Special mentions are due.
For the last year and a half, Corollario has been a major presence in my Paduan life:
Nunzio, Martina, Maria, Isabella and many more than I can list here. From them I
learned much more than singing (a skill which remains largely unknown to my body).
I’ve learned the power of people united by passion. I’ve learned lightness of heart can
be combined with the utmost commitment and passion. I will miss them dearly.
Davide, Francesco, Pietro, Valentina and the rest of my ‘Paduan’ friends were also
immensely important for my time here. I remember the time spent with them as exciting
v
vi CONTENTS
and fulfilling, and conversations with them stimulating and enriching. I know this has
been the beginning of a long-lasting friendship.
Not only my ‘new’ friends deserves an accolade: longtime friends have been the
solid rock on which I could set ashore everytime I met them again, despite spending
so much time far from them. All my friends from BVA, my flatmates, my ex university
and high school classmates and many more (among them, I can’t resist to name Linda,
Paolo, Astrid, Sylwia). I apologize: the time and energy I devoted to them in the last
two years wasn’t always enough to fully enjoy their company and truly be each other’s
mates. What we had together, I will treasure for life.
Finally, I had the fortune to be welcomed in a great community this year, which
makes me enthusiastic for my future. I have to thank Fosco, Fabrizio, and the rest of the
people from ItaCa, as well as the wider ACT community. Your selfless engagement with
my rookie excitement has been the America in which I didn’t even hope to run into.
Last but not least, my supervisor, prof. Maschio, deserves all of my thankfulness. He
gladly embarked with me in the last, foolish leg of my journey, helping me navigating an
ocean I would have never tamed otherwise. His enthusiasm and trust in my work have
been a great opportunity, and a major source of motivation. I hope our mathematical
activity will cross again in the coming years.
There are many other people with whom I crossed paths in a fruitful way, many more
than I can recall at the moment. Each of them brought me where I am now, therefore my




Category theory. Let C be a category. We always consider our categories to be locally
small, but not always small. We use the notation X : C to say X is an object of C. The
set of morphisms from an object X : C and an object Y : C is denoted by C(X, Y). The
identity morphism of X is denoted by 1X . Composition of X
f→ Y and Y g→ Z is denoted
by g ◦ f , or simply by juxtaposition (g f ) if there’s no risk of ambiguity.
If C has a terminal object, we denote it by 1 and we denote by !X the unique morphism
X → 1. Dually, we denote initial objects by 0 and we call ?X the unique morphism
0→ X.
If C has finite products, we denote by ∆X the diagonal morphism X  X × X,
defined as the equalizer of the two projections X × X ⇒ X. If a subobject classifier is
available in C, the characteristic morphism of ∆X will be denoted by δX .
If C has products, and Z
f→ X and Z g→ Y are morphisms, we denote by 〈 f , g〉 the
unique morphism Z → X×Y which makes the relevant diagram commute. Moreover,







An analogous notation applies to products of more than two factors. If instead we have
two morphisms X
f→ Y and Z g→ W, we denote by f × g the morphism 〈 f πX, gπZ〉 :
X × Z → Y ×W, where πX and πZ are projections out of X × Z and the universal
property invoked is the one of Y×W.
If C has exponentials, then the exponential of Y by X is denoted by YX, and the
vii
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evaluation map YX × X → Y by evYX . The transpose Z → YX of a map X× Z
f→ Y is
denoted by λX f .
If C has a subobject classifier, we denote it by 1 true→ Ω. The characteristic map of a
subobject U
m
 X will be denoted by χm or, if it’s clear to which mono U → X we are
referring to, simply χU .
Finally, we’ll denote byよ(read ‘yo’) and よthe Yoneda and co-Yoneda embeddings,
respectively:
C [Cop, Set] Cop [C, Set].
よ よ
Logic. Throughout the thesis, we adopt classical Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with
axiom of choice (ZFC) as our metatheory.
When treating a type theory, we denote typing judgments using a colon: t : X. The
context of a term or formula is put between square brackets at the end. If t : Y [x : X]
and s : Z [y : Y] are terms, we denote the term of type Z obtained by substituting each
occurence of y in s with t by s[y/t] : Z [x : X].
Ordered sets. We’ll often deal with totally ordered sets, such as N or R. In that context,
if (I,≤) is the total order and t ∈ I, then we employ the following notations:
t↑= {s ∈ I | t ≤ s}, t= t↑ \{t},
t↓= {s ∈ I | s ≤ t}, t= t↓ \{t}.
Miscellanea. Sometimes, to denote a structured set (X, structure), we underline it: X,
to distinguish it from the carrier set X.
Chapter 1
Preliminaries on logic
We recall some facts about the algebraic and logical structures we are going to use in the
subsequent chapters.
1.1 Algebraic structures
Definition 1.1. An Heyting algebra is a poset (H,≤) which admits all finite joins and
meets, and moreover has a binary operation⇒ satisfying
a ∧ b ≤ c iff a ≤ b⇒ c.
This definition implies some good properties: the poset H is bounded, meaning
there are a top (>) and bottom (⊥) element, and it is a distributive lattice, meaning:
a ∧ (b ∨ c) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c).
Using categorical lingo, a Heyting algebra is a posetal, finitely cocomplete and cartesian
closed category. A Heyting algebra is complete if it is bicomplete in the categorical
sense, hence if it admits arbitrary joins and meets (i.e. indexed by any set). Moreover, in








Logical meaning. A Heyting algebra is the algebraic incarnation of intuitionistic
propositional logic. In fact the operators ∧, ∨ and ⇒ behave exactly as intuitionis-
tic conjunction, disjunction and implication do, respectively, while the order structure
1
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captures entailment. Moreover, we can define
¬a ≡ a⇒ ⊥
and see this too satisfies the required properties, including the possible failure of the
law of excluded middle. In fact, in a Heyting algebra it is not necessarily the case that
¬a ∨ a = >, while a ≤ ¬¬a and a ∧ ¬a = ⊥ hold.
More rigorously speaking, one can show the set of propositions (up to logical equiv-
alence, see later) of an intuitionistic propositional theory, ordered by logical entailment,
is a Heyting algebra, whose meet, join and implication operator correspond to their
logical equivalents. This algebra is called the Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra of the theory.
The equivalent algebraic structure for classical logic is now easy to guess:
Definition 1.2. A Boolean algebra is a Heyting algebra where
¬¬a = a.
In categorical lingo, a Boolean algebra is a ∗-autonomous Heyting algebra, whose
dualizing object is ⊥. Indeed, unpacking the additional axiom of Boolean algebras we
get
a = (a⇒ ⊥)⇒ ⊥.
Internal Heyting algebras. We can formulate the definition of Heyting algebra in any
sufficiently structured category, simply by requiring the axioms of Heyting algebras
hold for generalized elements
Definition 1.3. Let C be a category with pullbacks. An internal Heyting algebra in C
is an object H : C together with a subobject
O H × H,≤
and three arrows
H × H H
H × H H




such that, for any object X : C,
(よH(X), (よ≤)X)
is a Heyting algebra with respect to the operations (よ∧)X , (よ∨)X , (よ⇒)X .
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Recall that よH(X) is the set of generalized element of H at stage X, hence the
hom-set C(X, H). From this point of view, the definition of internal Heyting algebra
prescribes the generalized elements of H to form a Heyting algebra at every stage of
definition. Thus if X a→ H and X b→ H are generalized elements of (H,≤), we can say
things like
a ∧ b ≤ a, b ≤ a ∨ b, . . .
Prealgebras. As we’ve seen above, Lindenbaum–Tarski algebras become Heyting alge-
bras only after quotienting by logical equivalence, otherwise entailment of propositions
is not a partial order, but only a preorder. Nevertheless, we can turn to a slightly more
lax version of Heyting and Boolean algebras:
Definition 1.4. A Heyting prealgebra is a preorder whose posetal reflection1 is a Heyt-
ing algebra.
Likewise, we define Boolean prealgebras as those Heyting prealgebras whose posetal
reflection is Boolean.
In a Heyting or Boolean prealgebra, all the objects singled out by an universal
property are no more uniquely defined, but are defined only up to posetal equivalence.
This fact brings the definition of join, meets and implication (and thus of top and
bottom element as well) even more similar in spirit to their categorical generalizations.
Unfortunately, this means definitions whose right hand side is an expression involving
meets, joins or implications are not well-posed anymore, unless we assume there is
a canonical choice of meet, join and implication between any two elements of the
prealgebra. We’ll employ this strategy silently in the rest of the thesis.
Morphisms. In order to pack up all these kinds of structures in full-blown categories,
we must specify what are the morphisms between them.
Definition 1.5. A morphism of Heyting algebras is a monotone function preserving
finite joins, finite meets and implication.
Boolean algebras have the same morphisms as Heyting algebras, as Boolean-ness is
just a property, i.e. Boolean algebras have no additional structure for the morphisms to
1Given a preorder, its posetal reflection is the poset one gets by quotienting by posetal equivalence:
a ' b iff a ≤ b and b ≤ a.
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preserve. This also means the category of Boolean algebras Bool is embedded in the
category of Heyting algebras Hey.
Suitably relaxing the notion of ‘preservation’, we get also morphisms of Heyting
prealgebras:
Definition 1.6. A morphism of Heyting prealgebras is a monotone function preserving
joins, meets and implication up to posetal equivalence.
We denote the category of Heyting prealgebras as PreHey. Evidently, it sits inside
the category PreOrd of preorders. Notice that PreHey and Hey also have a 2-categorical
structure: a 2-cell from the 1-cell H
f→ H′ to the 1-cell H g→ H′ is simply given by
pointwise inequality:
f ≤ g :≡ f (a) ≤H′ g(a), for all a ∈H.
This allows us to speak of 2-categorical notions like equivalences and adjoint maps. The




such that 1H ≤ g f and f g ≤ 1H′ . In this case, we write f a g.
Finally, as for any 2-category, it feels natural to consider suitably weakened versions
of functors and natural transformations. A pseudofunctor C F→ PreOrd is like a functor
except functoriality is only satisfied up to equivalence, i.e. for all morphisms A
f→ B g→ C
in C, we have
F(g)F( f ) ' F(g f ), F(1A) ' 1F(A).
In the same spirit, a pseudonatural transformation is a transformation between parallel
pseudofunctors satisfying naturality only up to equivalence.
1.2 Flavours of complete lattices
Locales, frames and complete Heyting algebras are three names for the same algebraic
structure. Nonetheless, the difference in naming reflects a difference in the morphisms
we consider between them [Picado and Pultr 2011, Section II.1]:
1. A morphism of frames is a (monotone) map preserving finite meets and arbitrary
joins. Frames with these arrows form the category Frm.
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2. A morphism of complete Heyting algebras is a morphism of frames which in
addition preserves implication. Complete Heyting algebras with these arrows
form the category CHey, which is a non-full subcategory of Frm.
3. A morphism of locales is a morphism of frames in the opposite direction, i.e. the
category of locales Loc is formally Frmop.
Complete Boolean algebras can also be seen as frames and locales. In particular,
Boolean frames exhibit an interesting duality since if B is a Boolean frame, so is Bop.
Thus a natural notion of morphism of Boolean frames is that of a morphism preserving
both arbitrary meets and arbitrary joins. It turns out that the preservation of com-
plements follows from these two, hence morphisms of Boolean frames and complete
Boolean algebras coincide.
Moreover, complete Boolean algebras constitute a coreflective subcategory of CHey,
where the coreflector is given by ¬¬-weakening: it sends a Heyting algebra to its sub-
Boolean algebra of fixed points of ¬¬.
1.2.1 The adjoint functor theorem for posets
A pivotal theorem of category theory is Freyd’s characterization of adjoint functors
based on their continuity properties, i.e. their preservation of limits and colimits. Indeed,
it is a known fact that left and right adjoints preserve colimits and limits, respectively,
and Freyd’s Adjoint Functor Theorem [Picado and Pultr 2011, Proposition 7.2.2, Appendix
II] provides a sufficient condition for the converse to hold. The adjoint functor theorem
specializes to a particularly elegant result in the case of posetal categories:
Theorem 1.7 (Adjoint Functor Theorem for posets). Let f : A → B be a morphism of
posets, i.e. a monotone map between partially ordered sets. Assume A is complete and f preserves
all small meets. Then f has a left adjoint, defined as
f !(b) =
∧
{a ∈ A | b ≤ f (a)}, for all b ∈ B. (1.2.1)
Dually, if A is cocomplete and f preserves all small joins, then it has a right adjoint, defined as
f!(b) =
∨
{a ∈ A | f (a) ≤ b}, for all b ∈ B. (1.2.2)
The Adjoint Functor Theorem for posets is especially relevant for frames (and thus
locales). In fact morphisms of frames, which are cocomplete as posets, are of course
monotone maps. Hence the theorem tells us that inside the (2-)category of posets,
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morphisms of frames always come with a right adjoint of the form (1.2.1). Another
consequence is that every frame is an Heyting algebra, since distributivity of a ∧ −
means exactly such a map preserves small joins.
This is a useful fact also to make sense of morphisms of locales, which can be now
be identified (at least morally) with these right adjoints.
In the case of complete Boolean algebras (aka Boolean frames), the situation is even
richer, since a morphism of those structures preserves both meets and joins of arbitrary
families, thereby we conclude it has both posetal adjoints.
1.2.2 Adjoint modalities from morphisms of Boolean frames
The following is partially informed by [Moerdijk and MacLane 1992, Chapter IX].
Every adjunction gives rise to a monad and a comonad. In the case of frames, this
means that a morphism of frames f : A→ B induces an endomorphism
f f! =:  f : B→ B. (1.2.3)
having the following properties:
1. It is intensive:
 f (b) ≤ b, for all b ∈ B.
2. It is idempotent (or stable):
 f (b) ≤  f f (b), for all b ∈ B.
3. It is left exact, i.e. it preserves finite meets:
 f (b ∧ b′) ≤  f (b) ∧ f (b′), for all b, b′ ∈ B.
The first two properties are just a general fact about adjunctions (they amount to say  f
is a comonad). The last property is indeed peculiar of frames, since it is a consequence
of the fact f preserves joins as morphism of frames.
When f is a morphism of Boolean frames it possess a left adjoint too, hence we also
get a monad on B, namely
f f ! =: ♦ f : B→ B (1.2.4)
It enjoys dual properties to those of  f , namely:
1. It is extensive:
b ≤ ♦ f (b), for all b ∈ B.
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2. It is idempotent (or stable):
♦ f♦ f (b) ≤ ♦ f (b), for all b ∈ B.
3. It is right exact, i.e. it preserves finite joins:
♦ f (b ∨ b′) ≤ ♦ f (b) ∨♦ f (b′), for all b, b′ ∈ B.
Moreover, since the two adjunctions from which f and ♦ f arise are on the opposite
sides of the same morphism f , one gets
♦ f a  f .
Indeed, for every b, b′ ∈ B:
♦ f (b) ≤ b′ iff f f !(b) ≤ b′
iff f !(b) ≤ f!(b′)
iff b ≤ f f!(b′)
iff b ≤  f (b′).
Another useful relation is duality
¬♦ f =  f¬, (1.2.5)
which follows from the infinitary De Morgan’s laws holding in a Boolean frame.
1.3 Typed languages and theories
We are now to describe exactly the syntax of the languages we’ll be dealing with in the
following pages. These are so-called higher-order languages, in the sense of [Jacobs
2005, Section 5.1], thus typed languages with a special type, the type of propositions
Prop, whose terms correspond to formulae in a specific way.
First of all, with language we really mean type theory, meaning all the languages
we’ll deal with will be explicitly typed2 and presented with meta-level statements called
judgments:
2Just simply typed, hence no dependently typed or polymorphic.
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judgment applies to usage intended meaning
type types X type [~x :~Γ] well-formed type in context
typing terms t : Z [~x :~Γ] well-formed term in context
formula formulae ϕ [~x :~Γ] formula well-formed formula in context
equality types (X is equal to Y) type [~x :~Γ] syntactically interchangeable
terms (t is equal to s) : Z [~x :~Γ]
formulae (ϕ is equal to ψ) formula [~x :~Γ].
Equality judgment is deemed reflexive, symmetric and transitive hence equality
judgments arising from these properties are always tacitly assumed to hold. On the
contrary, instances of other kinds of judgments are introduced by specific rules.
Definition 1.8. The specification of any language starts from its vocabulary, which is a
collection of symbols:
1. A collection of types X, Y, Z, . . ., for which the type judgment is deemed to hold.
2. A collection of relation symbols R, S, T, . . ., each with a signature which is a
finite, possibly empty sequence of types (X1, . . . , Xn) whose length is called the
arity. Relations of arity zero are constants.
3. A collection of function symbols F, G, H, . . ., each with a signature (X1, . . . , Xn)
and a type Y.
As you can already appreciate from the description of judgments, we will also
emphasize the dependence of terms and formulae on contexts, since they play a primary
rôle in categorical logic:
Definition 1.9. A context is a finite, possibly empty, list3 of distinct typed variables:
~x :~Γ ≡ x1 : Γ1, . . . , xn : Γn.
The positive integer n is the length of the context
Remark 1.9.1. Let us linger briefly on two meta-theoretic notation conventions we are
going to use throughout the rest of the thesis.
3Being a list, order and multiplicity of its element matter. Being a list of typed variables, their names and
their types are also an integral part of the datum of a context.
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• The symbol ≡ denotes ‘definitional equality’, hence defines the left hand side as
a convenient placeholder for the right hand side.
• ‘Vector notation’ is a convention for writing down lists of variables, terms, types
or formulae. We will employ it quite freely, hoping its intended meaning will
always be unambiguous.
We stress a language4 L is just a syntactical device, hence without further indications
we are not able to speak of ‘proofs’ of a formula (or better, a sequent) nor it makes sense
to speak of ‘validity’.
If we imagine the theory L we are building out ofL as embodied by the Lindenbaum–
Tarski algebras5 of its formulae under the different contexts available, then at this stage
we only have the carrier set of the algebra.
To start talking about proofs, thus endowing the Lindenbaum–Tarski algebras with
an entailment relation `, one has to adopt a specific proof calculus, hence a flavour of
logic (e.g. classical, intuitionistic, paraconsistent, linear, etc.). The combination of a
language with a proof calculus6 is a theory. Thus if we speak of, say, ‘intuitionistic
theories’, we mean the datum of a language plus the logical rules of intuitionistic logic.
We make only a requirement on the entailment: it must respect judgmental equality.
In this way, judgmentally equal formulae are deemed equivalent (in the sense of the
posetal reflection of `).
Having a theory L at hand (e.g. the classical theory of groups), one can now start to
look for structures behaving as prescribed by L, i.e. models of L (e.g. specific examples of
groups). This portends investigating the semantics of L. This step requires one to specify
an interpretation of the underlying language L of L, which is a coherent assignment of
‘meaning’ (i.e. some part of the target model) to each syntactic expression of L (types,
relation and function symbols, terms, formulae). Now one can speak of validity of a
formula: a formula is valid when its meaning is ‘true’, ergo if its interpretation is the
same as the interpretation of the true predicate. In other words, we are now confronting
the theory with a given concrete model, which may or may not satsify a given formula
of L (e.g. a group may or may not be Abelian). Observe the notion of truth, upon which
4In this sense, a language is sometimes called a signature, for instance Jacobs uses this terminology in
[Jacobs 2005].
5This is partially true, as terms also need to be taken into account. We’ll see in Example 3.2 a better way to
wrap up a theory in an algebraic structure.
6Actually, ‘proof calculi’ and ‘logics’ do not entirely coincide, since different calculi might be logically
equivalent (i.e. generate the same entailment relation on formulae). Nevertheless, the only meaningful way to
distinguish a logic from another is by the derivations they allow, thence their proof calculi.
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satisfiability and validity depend, is drawn from the metalevel7, which is used to present
and define the model.
Often at this stage it is of interest to restrict one’s attention to the subclass of models
satisfying a certain list of axioms of interest, which are simply formulae of L we’d like
to be valid in the model (e.g. the commutativity axiom in the language of groups is
modelled by Abelian groups).
Finally, an interpretation is sound if it is also logically coherent with L, that is, if
the entailment relation of L is preserved in passing to the meaning. Soundness is an
especially important notion since it allows one to throw away the abstractness of L and
work directly in the model, which can be considerably easier.
1.3.1 First- and higher-order languages
We are ready to describe the particular flavour of languages we are interested with.
Definition 1.10. A first-order language L is a typed language defined as follows. For
any context [~x :~Γ]:
1. Terms in context are generated by the following rules:
xi : Γi [~x :~Γ]
(for any xi : Γi appearing in the context) (1.3.1)
t1 : Z1 [~x :~Γ], . . . , tn : Zn [~x :~Γ]
F(t1, . . . , tn) :Y[~x : Γ]
(for any fun. symbol F : ~Z → Y) (1.3.2)
2. Formulae in context are generated by the following rules:
false [~x :~Γ] formula true [~x :~Γ] formula
(1.3.3)
t1 : Z1 [~x :~Γ], . . . , tn : Zn [~x :~Γ]
R(t1, . . . , tn) [~x : Γ] formula
(for any rel. symbol R of signature ~Z) (1.3.4)
ϕ [~x :~Γ] formula, ψ [~x :~Γ] formula
(ϕ ∧ ψ) [~x :~Γ] formula
ϕ [~x :~Γ] formula, ψ [~x :~Γ] formula
(ϕ ∨ ψ) [~x :~Γ] formula
(1.3.5)
7This ‘definition of truth’ is due to Tarski [Hodges 2018], and it’s one of many possible alternatives. Another
major form of semantics leans on games [Hodges and Väänänen 2019].
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ϕ [~x :~Γ] formula, ψ [~x :~Γ] formula
(ϕ→ ψ) [~x :~Γ] formula
(1.3.6)
ϕ [~x :~Γ, z : Z] formula
(∃z : Z ϕ) [~x :~Γ] formula
ϕ [~x :~Γ, z : Z] formula
(∀z : Z ϕ) [~x :~Γ] formula
(1.3.7)
Remark 1.10.1. We are going to use the following abbreviations:
(¬ϕ) [~x :~Γ] ≡ (ϕ→ false) [~x :~Γ],
(ϕ↔ ψ) [~x :~Γ] ≡ ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ→ ϕ)) [~x :~Γ].
Remark 1.10.2. Notice in a term or formula in context ~x : Γ, every free variable must
appears on the list ~x : ~Γ. Nonetheless, we have a certain leeway in the handling of
contexts, reassuring us they only have a bookkeeping rôle in the syntax, as the following
lemmata illustrates:
Lemma 1.11 (Substitution). For any first-order language L, the following are valid rules:
t :Y [~x :~Γ], s : Z [y :Y, ~w :~Θ]
(s[y/t]) : Z [~x :~Γ, ~w :~Θ]
t :Y [~x :~Γ], ϕ [y :Y, ~w :~Θ] formula
(ϕ[y/t]) [~x :~Γ, ~w :~Θ] formula
(1.3.8)
Proof. Induction on the construction of terms and formulae.
Corollary 1.11.1 (Weakening). Let ~x : ~Γ, ~y : ~∆ be contexts. Then the following are valid
formation rules:
t : Z [~x :~Γ]
t : Z [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆]
ϕ [~x :~Γ] formula
ϕ [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆] formula
(1.3.9)
Corollary 1.11.2 (Permutation). Let ~x :~Γ be a context of length n and σ a permutation of
{1, ..., n} objects. Denote with ~x′ :~Γ′ the context where we put x′i : Γ′i ≡ xσ(i) : Γσ(i). Then the
following are valid formation rules:
t : Z [~x :~Γ]
t : Z [~x′ :~Γ′]
ϕ [~x :~Γ] formula
ϕ [~x′ :~Γ′] formula
(1.3.10)
Definition 1.12. A higher-order language L is a first-order language augmented with:
1. For each list of types ~∆, a type of propositions over ~∆:
~∆→ Prop type [~x :~Γ]
(for every context [~x :~Γ])
2. For each list of types ~∆, a membership relation symbol ∈~∆ of signature (~∆,~∆→
Prop).
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Membership relations are introduced in formulae through rule (1.3.4) for introducing
relations, which specializes to:
σ :~∆→ Prop [~x :~Γ], t1 : ∆1 [~x :~Γ], . . . tn : ∆n [~x :~Γ]
t1, . . . , tn ∈~∆ σ [~x :~Γ] formula
(1.3.11)
Notice we are using infix notation to write membership relations. Moreover, we will
often resort to the vector notation to denote the list of terms on the left of a membership
symbol:
~t ∈~∆ σ ≡ t1, . . . , tn ∈~∆ σ.
Terms of type ~∆→ Prop are introduced by the rule
ϕ [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆] formula
{~y :~∆ | ϕ} :~∆→ Prop [~x :~Γ]
(1.3.12)
Remark 1.12.1. The language is higher-order since quantification over ~Γ→ Prop sim-
ulates quantification over predicates over ~Γ. As ~Γ→ Prop is itself a list of types (of
length 1), we can iterate this as many times as we want and quantify over predicates of
arbitrary high order.
Remark 1.12.2. Observe we defined the types~Γ→ Prop ad-hoc, and thus are not proper
function types. If we had assumed L to have function types, it would have been
sufficient to postulate the presence of the type Prop (along with its membership relation
∈1) and then one could have defined
~Γ→ Prop ≡ Γ1 → · · · → Γn → Prop.
The membership relation ∈~Γ could have been then emulated by defining:
~x ∈~Γ σ [~x :~Γ] ≡ ∈1(ev~Γ→Prop(σ,~x)) [~x :~Γ]
where ev~Γ→Prop is the eliminator for the function type~Γ→ Prop.
Definition 1.13. An higher-order intuitionistic theory L is a higher-order language L
considered with the proof calculus of first-order intuitionistic predicate logic [Jacobs
2005, Figure 4.1] and the following rules
Θ ~̀Γ,~∆ ϕ [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆]
Θ ~̀Γ,~∆ ~y ∈~∆ {~y :~∆ | ϕ} [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆]
,
Θ ~̀Γ,~∆ ~y ∈~∆ {~y :~∆ | ϕ} [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆]
Θ ~̀Γ,~∆ ϕ [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆]
(1.3.13)
Remark 1.13.1. Rules (1.3.13) say that ϕ [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆] and ~y ∈~∆ {~y :~∆ | ϕ} [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆] are
logically equivalent. If we adopt the perspective by which functional types are special
functional types, then both rules follows from β-conversion (indeed, this is how Jacobs




2.1 Categorical preliminaries on measurability structures
For this section, we reference [Tao 2011].
Definition 2.1. A σ-algebra is a countably complete Boolean algebra, that is, a Boolean
algebra which admits all countable joins.
Definition 2.2. A σ-field on a set X is a sub-σ-algebra of P (X).
A σ-field, being a sub-σ-algebra of P (X), is a Boolean algebra with respect to the
set-theoretic operations. In particular, it’s ordered by inclusion.
Definition 2.3. A measurable space is a pair (X, E) where X is a set and E is a σ-field
on X. The elements of E are called measurable subsets of X.
Definition 2.4. A measurable map is a map (X, E) f→ (Y,F ) between measurable
spaces pulling measurable subsets of Y back to measurable subsets of X:
f−1(A) ∈ F , for all A ∈ E .
Measurable spaces and maps gather in a category Msbl which is concrete, having
a forgetful functor to Set. This functor has both adjoints: the left one equipping a set
X with its discrete σ-field P (X) and the right one equipping a set X with codiscrete
σ-field {∅, X}.
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Example 2.5. If (X, τ) is a topological space, then there’s a standard way to turn it into a
measurable space by equipping it with its Borel σ-field B(X), i.e. the σ-field generated
by its open sets. It’s easy to see a continuous map between topological spaces becomes
measurable once both its domain and codomain are equipped with their Borel σ-fields.
Hence B is a faithful functor Top→ Msbl. It is not full as many discontinuous functions
are nevertheless measurable, e.g. any monotone function (R,B(R)) → (R,B(R)) is
measurable regardless of its continuity.
Example 2.6. Famously, not every set of R can be measurable by the standard Lebesgue
measure (see Example 2.20), i.e. the restriction of measures to proper subsets of P (X) is
necessary. However, this depends on the axioms we choose for our set theory: every
example of a non-measurable set (such as Vitali’s) depends on the axiom of choice. There
are models of ZF in which every subset of R is Lebesgue measurable [Solovay 1970].
Incidentally, the construction of such models uses the machinery of essential algebras
we are going to use in Chapter 4
Lemma 2.7. The category Msbl admits arbitrary products.
Proof. Given a family of σ-fields {Ei}i∈I , we can define their product (in the categorical
sense) by forcing the canonical projection maps to be measurable. In order to realize




Ei := 〈π−1i Ai | i ∈ I, Ai ∈ Ei〉
where 〈−〉 denotes the σ-field generated by the family of subsets in its argument. It
coincides with the smallest σ-field containing it. Let now {(Xi, Ei)}i∈I be a family of
measurable spaces: its product is the pair (X, E) where X = ∏i∈I Xi and E was defined
above.
Remark 2.7.1. Although Msbl admits arbitrary products, it’s not cartesian closed [Au-
mann et al. 1961]. To overcome the latter obstacle [Heunen et al. 2017] recently intro-
duced a category of so-called quasi-Borel spaces, in which real-valued measurable
functions are axiomatized in lieu of measurable subsets.
Lemma 2.8. Let G be a family of subsets of a set X. Then the σ-field 〈G〉 (the smallest σ-field
containing G) coincides with the limit of the following sequence (Gα)α∈ON defined by transfinite
recursion:
1. G0 := G,
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2. Gα+1 = S(Gα),
3. Gλ := S(
⋃
α<λ Gα) for λ limit ordinal,
where S(·) denotes the family of all countable unions and complements of the sets in its argument.
Proof. We start by noticing that the above transfinite sequence stabilizes at ω1, since Gω1
is stable under complements and countable unions. Indeed, if E ∈ Gω1 then E ∈ Aα for
some countable α and thus X \ E ∈ Aα+1 ⊂ Gω1 . Moreover, suppose {En}n∈N ⊆ Gω1 .
For any En, there exists a countable ordinal αn such that En ∈ Aαn . But now, as ω1 is
uncountable, α∞ =
⋃
n∈N αn < ω1, so that
⋃
n∈N En ∈ Aα∞ ⊂ Gω1 .
This property is actually equivalent to saying Gω1 forms a σ-field itself. Hence we
immediately get, by minimality, that 〈G〉 ⊆ Gω1 . On the other hand, by the same
stability property, since G = G0 sits in 〈G〉 by definition, we conclude every Aα is
contained in 〈G〉 as well. This proves the other containment, proving the claim.
Lemma 2.9. Let (X, EX), (Y, EY), (Z, EZ) be measurable spaces and ϕ : X×Y → Z a
measurable map. Then, for every y ∈ Y and x ∈ X, its curryings ϕ(·, y) : X → Z and
ϕ(x, ·) : Y → Z are measurable maps too.
Proof. By symmetry of the cartesian product, it suffices to consider the first currying
ϕ(·, y) : X → Z. Let A ∈ EZ. Then
ϕ(·, y)−1 A = {x ∈ X | ϕ(x, y) ∈ A} = πX(ϕ−1 A).
Since ϕ is measurable, B = ϕ−1 A is a measurable subset of X × Y, i.e. it belongs to
the product σ-field EX ⊗ EY. We now leverage Lemma 2.8 to prove πXB is measurable,
arguing by transfinite induction. Indeed this is trivially true for any B ∈ G0 = {C×
D |C ∈ EX, D ∈ EY}, and since πX is surjective, it commutes with S(·): images do
always commute with unions and surjectivity of πX gives commutativity with respect
to complements.
2.1.1 Probability spaces
As the name suggests, measurable spaces are just a platform for the gadget of a measure.
Definition 2.10. A measure on a measurable space (X, E) is a function µ : E → [0,+∞]
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Remark 2.10.1. The (possibly infinite) sum at the right hand side of the identity defining
σ-additivity is well-defined since the character (and, in case of convergence, the sum) of
a series with positive terms doesn’t depend on the order of summation.
Measurable spaces equipped with a measure are called measure spaces. They form
a category as well, whose arrows are again measurable maps, that we denote by Meas.
These maps transport measures covariantly: if (X, E) f→ (Y,F ) is a measurable map,
and if µ is a measure on X, then
f∗µ := µ ◦ f−1
is a measure on Y called the pushforward measure.
Meager subsets. Subsets of zero measure have a prominent role in measure theory.
Definition 2.11. A measurable subset of a measure space (X, E , µ) is meager or null iff
such is its measure. We denote the family of meager subsets by ker µ. If P (A) ⊆ ker µ
for every A ∈ ker µ, then X is said to be complete.
Example 2.12. The Borel σ-field of R is not complete. Its completion is called Lebesgue
σ-field.
Definition 2.13. A measurable map (X, E , µ) f→ (Y,F , ν) between measure spaces is
null-preserving if it pulls meager subsets back to meager subsets:
f−1(A) ∈ ker µ, for all A ∈ ker ν.
Null-preserving maps form a subcategory in both Meas and Prob, which we denote
by Meas0 and Prob0, respectively. The first has been defined in [Wendt 1996], while the
latter has been defined in [Adachi and Ryu 2016], although with arrows reversed.
Remark 2.13.1. Any measure space can be completed canonically by replacing its σ-
field by the one generated by adjoining all subsets of meager subsets. Notice this
completion procedure only involves the σ-field E and the measure µ, hence one often
talks about complete σ-fields. This construction is left adjoint to the inclusion functor
CMsbl0 ↪→ Msbl0 of the full subcategory of complete measurable spaces and null-
preserving maps, exhibiting it as a reflective subcategory of Msbl. Completion is not
functorial on the whole Msbl, since adjoining new subsets to the codomain of a map
may invalidate its measurability.
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Definition 2.14. Let (X, E) be a measurable space, and let µ, ν be two measures on X.
Then we say ν is absolutely continuous with respect to µ, written ν µ, iff
ker µ ⊆ ker ν.
Example 2.15. If (X, E , µ) f→ (Y,F , ν) is a null-preserving map, then f∗µ is absolutely
continuous with respect to ν. The converse is also true.
Finiteness conditions. We distinguish various kinds of such spaces:
Definition 2.16. A probability space is a measure space (Ω,F , P) such that P(Ω) = 1.
In this case, elements of F are called events and P is their probability.
Definition 2.17. A measure space is σ-finite if it can be expressed as the union of a
countable family of sets of finite measure.
Construction of measures. To construct a measure can be a tricky business: σ-fields
may contain very complicated sets, even if we generate them from ‘nice’ sets (like
intervals in the case of R). The following is thus a very important theorem is measure
theory, as it allows one to extend an assignment on a sufficiently rich generating family
to a full-blown measure.
Definition 2.18. A premeasure on a set X is a function preµ : B → [0,+∞] such that
1. B ⊆ P (X) is a Boolean subalgebra, i.e. it’s closed under finite unions and
complements,
2. preµ is σ-additive whenever that makes sense: if {An}n∈N ⊆ B are pairwise disjoint
and such that
⋃









A measure µ : F → [0,+∞] extends preµ if B ⊆ F and µ|B ≡ preµ.
Theorem 2.19 (Hahn–Kolmogorov’s Extension Theorem). Let X be a set, B ⊆ P (X) a
Boolean algebra. Then every premeasure preµ : B → [0,+∞] can be extended to a measure
µ : E → [0,+∞], where E = 〈B〉.
Proof. See [Tao 2011, Theorem 1.7.8].
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Remark 2.19.1. The theorem doesn’t guarantee uniqueness of the extension, but it does
so under the mild assumption that (X, E , µ) is σ-finite. In that case, given a second
extension µ′ defined on the σ-field E ′, one can show µ and µ′ agree on E ∩ E ′ [Tao 2011,
Exercise 1.7.7]. Hence µ is the unique extension of preµ on E (although not necessarily
the maximal possible one).
Example 2.20. The standard measure on R, Lebesgue’s measure λ : B(R)→ [0,+∞], is
obtained by Hahn–Kolmogorov extension. The premeasure is first defined on closed
intervals by preλ([a, b]) = b− a, and then extended by imposing additivity to a full
premeasure preλ : I → [0,+∞] (where I is the Boolean algebra generated by closed
intervals).
To us, the most useful application of Theorem 2.19 will be to define the product of
measures.
Lemma 2.21. If (X, E , µ) and (Y,F , ν) are σ-finite measure spaces, their product is uniquely
given by
(X×Y, E ⊗ F , µ× ν)
where µ× ν is constructed by Hahn–Kolmogorov extension of the premeasure
(µ× ν)(A× B) = µ(A) ν(B), for all A ∈ E , B ∈ F .
Proof. See [Tao 2011, Proposition 1.7.11].
The σ-finiteness assumption cannot be relaxed in generality without giving up
uniqueness of the product measure [Tao 2011, Remark 1.7.12]. Hence the category of
measure spaces Meas does not admit every product, not even all the finite ones.
If we restrict our attention to the (sub)category of probability spaces Prob though, we
get every product:
Definition 2.22. Let {(Xi, Ei)}i∈I be a family of measurable spaces. A cylindrical set
(or simply cylinder) is a subset A ⊆ ∏i∈I Xi such that πi A = Xi for all but finitely many
i ∈ I.
Lemma 2.23. Let {(Xi, Ei, Pi)}i∈I be a family of probability spaces. Then its product (X, E , P)




Proof. See [Cohn 2013, Proposition 10.6.1], [Saeki 1996].
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Remark 2.23.1. Notice products of σ-finite and probability measures can be rephrased
in term of pushforward measures: the measure µ is the smallest (domain-wise) such
that πi∗µ = µi for every i ∈ I, when it exists. This, in turn, amounts to the universal
property of products.
Despite Prob having all products, it isn’t complete: limits of systems of probability
spaces do not always exist [Cohn 2013, Exercise 10.6.5]. The Kolmogorov Consistency
Theorem gives sufficient conditions for a limit to exist [Cohn 2013, Theorem 10.6.2].
2.1.2 The Giry monad
The set of probability measures on a measurable space (X, E), denoted by GX is itself a
measurable space if equipped with the σ-field GE generated by evaluation maps:
evA : GX −→ [0, 1], A ∈ E
P 7−→ P(A)







Proposition 2.24 ([Lawvere 1962]). The endofunctor G is a monad. Its unit η : 1→ G sends
points to Dirac measures:
ηX(x) = δx, for all x ∈ X.




evA dP, for all P ∈ GGX and A ∈ E .
Monads of this kind are called probability monads. They generalize the monad
of parts on Set to more structured valuations. In fact, variants of the Giry monad
can be defined for Polish spaces [Giry 1982], quasi-Borel spaces [Heunen et al. 2017],
topological spaces [Fritz, Perrone, and Rezagholi 2019], locales [Vickers 2011] and
many other contexts [nLab authors 2020]. Distribution monads [Fritz 2009], which
assign to a set its set of formal convex combinations of points, can be considered ‘finite
approximations’ to probability monads, as described in [Fritz and Perrone 2019].
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We will make use of the Kleisli category of the Giry monad, the category Markov of
measurable spaces as objects and Markov kernels as arrows:
Definition 2.25. Let (X, E), (Y,F ) be measurable spaces. A Markov kernel X 7→ Y is a
map K : F × X → [0, 1] such that
1. for each A ∈ F , K(A,−) : X → [0, 1] is an E -measurable map,
2. for each x ∈ X, K(−, x) : F → [0, 1] is a probability measure on Y.
As noticed already by Lawvere [Lawvere 1962], Markov kernels can be thought as
‘random maps’: the probability measure K(−, x) represents the probability that x lands
in a given subset of Y.
Markov kernels compose by convolution: if K : (S, Σ) 7→ (T, Ξ) and H : (T, Ξ) 7→




H(B,−)dK(−, s), for all B ∈ Λ, s ∈ S.
Associativity holds by Fubini–Tonelli. Identities are given by Dirac kernels:
1(S,Σ)(A, s) = δs(A), for all A ∈ Σ, s ∈ S.
2.2 Stochastic processes
This section is informed by [Caravenna 2011; Grimmett and Stirzaker 2001].
The central notion of a stochastic calculus is a stochastic process or, from now on,
simply a process. This is misleading, however, since ‘vanilla processes’ are almost never
used. As we will see, the real focus is actually on those processes which interact well
with the second central notion of stochastic calculus, the filtration.
Throughout this section, we fix the following notation:
1. Ω = (Ω,F , P) is a probability space, i.e. F is a σ-field on the set Ω and P is a
measure with total mass 1.
2. E = (E, E) is a measurable space, i.e. E is a σ-field on the set E. This space will
usually be R = (R,B(R)), which is the real numbers together with the σ-field
generated by its open sets.
3. I = (I, 0,+,≤) is a totally ordered commutative monoid (a time monoid), by
convention a suborder of (R,≤). Stochastic calculus is usually concerned with
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two cases: I = N (discrete time) and I = R+ (continuous time). When used as
a measurable space, I is assumed to be equipped with its Borel σ-field, i.e. the
one generated by its downward closed subsets.
We call a random variable any real-valued measurable function. Otherwise, a
measurable function Ω→ E will also be called a random element of E.
Definition 2.26. A stochastic process X over Ω is an I-indexed collection of random
elements of E, i.e.
X = {Xt : Ω→ E}t∈I
From now on, if we refer to a process X we refer to a process as defined above.
Definition 2.27. Let X and Y be processes over the same space Ω, indexed by the same
set I.
1. We say X is a modification of Y if
P(Xt = Yt) = 1, for all t ∈ I.
2. We say X is indistinguishable from Y if
P(∀t ∈ I, Xt = Yt) = 1.
2.2.1 Filtrations
Definition 2.28. A filtration of Ω is a family of sub-σ-fields F• = {Ft}t∈I of F totally
ordered by inclusion.
In the following, we denote by Ωt the probability space (Ω,Ft, P).
Definition 2.29. A filtration {Ft}t∈I of a complete probability space Ω is complete if
each Ωt is complete.
This means ker P is closed under taking subsets (completeness) and ker P ⊆ Ft for
every t ∈ I.




Fs =: Ft+ (2.2.1)
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A complete and right continuous filtration is called augmented. Any filtration can
be augmented in the obvious way: first complete every Ft (as in Remark 2.13.1) and
then make (2.2.1) into an assignment.
A filtration represents events we know about, as time passes. To give an example:
our random base could be Ω = (6× 6, 26×6, #), representing the throw of two dice. Then
a natural filtration for this space is:
F0 = {∅, Ω}
F1 = {A× B | A ⊆ 6, B = 6 or B = ∅}
F2 = P (Ω) .
That is, before any dice is thrown we can only talk about anything or nothing happening,
then after the first dice is thrown we can talk about anything regarding the first dice
but still say nothing about the second, and finally we can talk about any possible event
regarding the throw of both dice.
The absence of left continuity instead means we can have surprises from the future,
which is usually a reasonable thing to expect (imagine a stock price suddenly jumping
because of something unpredictable happening). Right continuity means these surprises
come at definite moments in time.
Example 2.31. Consider the set Ω = 2N of infinite sequences of coin tosses. We construct
its probability space structure by finite approximations. Hence for any Ωn = 2n, we
simply consider its full algebra of parts P (Ωn) together with the counting measure Pn,
so that any single sequence of launches has probability 1/2n. Define
Fn := {A× 2N | A ∈ P (Ωn)}
Clearly each of these is a σ-field on Ω. Define F∞ = 〈Fn | n ∈ N〉. Moreover, let
B = ⋃n∈N Fn. This family is a Boolean algebra. On B we can define a premeasure preP
by using the probability measures on each Ωn:
preP(A) := Pn(A), where n is the least n ∈N such that A ∈ Fn.
Intuitively, a set A ∈ B ‘contains only a finite number of finite sequences of launches’, so
that we can consider it a subset in Fn for n = “length of the longest sequence appearing
in A”, and thus we can measure it using Pn. By Hahn–Kolmogorov extension, we obtain
a probability measure P defined on the whole F∞ and agreeing with preP on B.
Eventually, we have built the space (2N,F∞, P) and a filtration F• = {Fn}n∈N.
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Definition 2.32. The natural filtration associated to a stochastic process X is the filtra-
tion defined as
FXt = 〈Xs | s ≤ t〉
for every t ∈ I.
Definition 2.33. A filtration G• of Ω is a sub-filtration of F• whenever
Gt ⊆ Ft, for all t ∈ I.
Clearly filtrations of Ω with this order (which is just pointwise order) form a poset
we denote by F. If F• is a sub-filtration of G•, we’ll also say F• is coarser than G•, or
that G• is finer than F•.
2.2.2 Measurability properties
For this part, it is useful to recall I comes equipped with a canonical σ-field generated
by its downward closed subsets.
Definition 2.34. A stochastic process X is adapted to the filtration F• if its natural
filtration FX• is a subfiltration of F•.
The following are self-evident:
Proposition 2.35. The natural filtration FX• associated to a stochastic process X is the coarsest
filtration in F for which X is an adapted process.
Proposition 2.36. A stochastic process X is adapted to the filtration F• if and only if each Xt
is Ft-measurable.
Definition 2.37. A stochastic process X is measurable if the function
X : Ω× I → E,
defined by X(ω, t) = Xt(ω), is a measurable function.
Remark 2.37.1. Obviously any such function gives rise to a stochastic process, since the
components of a measurable map are measurable. The converse, however, isn’t true, so
the notion of measurable process is non-trivial.
Definition 2.38. A stochastic process X is progressively measurable if for every t ∈ I,
the function
Xt↓ : Ωt × t↓→ E,
defined by Xt↓(ω, t) = Xt(ω), is a measurable function.
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This last condition is the strongest of the three. Any progressively measurable
process is measurable and adapted, while the converse is only true up to modification.
If E is a topological space, then we can speak of continuity of the process.
Definition 2.39. A (resp. right, left) continuous process is a process {Xt}t∈I such that,
for every ω ∈ Ω, X(ω,−) is a (resp. right, left) continuous function I → E where I is
considered equipped with its order topology.
Right continuous processes enjoy strong measurability properties: they are all mea-
surable. Furthermore, if an adapted right continuous process is always progressively
measurable. This second implication now holds on the nose, without resorting to a
modification. Hence for right continuous processes,
progressive measurability iff adaptedness.
Finally, let us mention that this holds also in case the process is only almost surely right
continuous, albeit only if we assume the given filtration to be standard.
This last setting is the most common in stochastic calculus, since it is a sweet spot
between generality and good properties. Most importantly, it reflects the intuitive
properties of the real-life situations stochastic calculus would like to model: a right
continuous process is something varying continuously in time, up to unpredictable
‘surprises’ (the same intuition behind right continuous filtrations). An adapted process
is one whose ‘value’ at time t only depends on the information available up to that
time.
A good guiding application to keep in mind when trying to understand stochastic
calculus notion is gambling or investment (the discrete and continuous time cases,
respectively). In this setting:
1. the probability space Ω models the context in which our gamble or investment
occurs, such as the outcomes of a string of coin tosses or the varying prices in a
stock market,
2. the filtration F• represents our growing knowledge of the events,
3. the stochastic process X is the outcome of such gamblings, or investment strategy,
i.e. Xt is the amount of money we earned or lost up to time t.
Then right continuity of both F• and X are reasonable modelling assumptions, whilst
the adaptedness of X means we cannot use information from the future to decide our
gambling strategy.
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2.2.3 Conditional expectation
Definition 2.40. Let G be a sub-σ-field of F , V be a random variable over Ω. Then we
define the conditional expectation of V on G to be the random variable E[V | G] such
that ∫
A
E[V | G]dP =
∫
A
V dP, ∀A ∈ G.
It is important to remark that E[V | G] indeed exists and it is unique up to almost
everywhere equality. This can be shown using Radon–Nikodym’s theorem, which
deserves to be stated here:
Theorem 2.41 (Radon–Nikodym). Let (E, E , µ) be a σ-finite measure space. Let ν be a second
σ-finite measure on (E, E) such that ν  µ, i.e. such that ν is absolutely continuous with










dµ, for all A ∈ E .
Then
E[V | G] := dµ
V |G
dP|G
where µV is the measure µV(A) =
∫
A V dP. Intuitively, the conditional expectation of
V can be considered a version of V ‘averaged out’ over G.
Example 2.42. Let V be random variable, and consider any non-empty subset A ∈ F of
Ω. It generates a sub-σ-field 〈A〉 = {∅, A, AC, Ω}. Then
E[V | 〈A〉](ω) =
E[V1A] ω ∈ AE[V1AC ] ω ∈ AC
In general, E[V | G] is equal to E[V1A] on every atom A ∈ G, i.e. every non-empty
minimal subset of G.
Theorem 2.43. Let G be a sub-σ-field of F , let V and W be random variables on Ω. Then the
following hold almost surely:
1. The operator E[− | G] is linear:
E[αV + βW | G] = αE[V | G] + βE[W | G], ∀α, β ∈ R.
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2. If V is G-measurable,
E[V | G] = V.
3. If V ⊥ G, in particular whenever G = {∅, Ω},
E[V | G] = E[V].
4. If V is G-measurable and VW is integrable,
E[VW | G] = VE[W | G].
5. IfH is a sub-σ-field of G,
E[E[V | G] | H] = E[V | H].
In particular,
E[E[V | G]] = E[V].
2.2.4 Martingales
Definition 2.44. A martingale is a real-valued stochastic process X such that
1. Xt is integrable for every t ∈ I and
2. for each s ≤ t in I:
E[Xt | Fs] = Xs.
The first is a technical condition, which allows us to take expectations of the Xt. The
second condition is called martingality. If in this condition we replace equality with ≤
or ≥ we get the definition of, respectively, supermartingale and submartingale.
Intuitively, a martingale is a process whose expected outcome doesn’t change
through time. In the stochastic-processes-as-gambling-strategies metaphor, a martingale
is a gambling strategy which, on average, doesn’t achieve a net gain.
Example 2.45. Consider the space of infinite sequences of coin tosses, as built in Exam-
ple 2.31. Suppose we gamble on this random experiment, by betting a certain some of
money on each toss. If we win, we are paid twice our bet. Define X to be the process
representing our net gain when we gamble with the following betting strategy:
Bet 2n € on the n-th toss being ‘heads’.
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The reason behind this choice is the inequality
1 + 2 + . . . + 2n−1 < 2n.
Therefore even if we lose the first n− 1 bets, as soon as we win the n-th we compensate





2i (1ωi=H − 1ωi=T)
where ωi denotes the i-th item of the sequence ω ∈ 2N.
We claim this process is a martingale. Start by noticing the events {ωi = H} are all
independent: for all i 6= j
0 = P(ωi1 = H, . . . , ωin = H) = P(ωi1 = H) · · ·P(ωin = H) = 0, .
In particular, the events {ωi = H} for i > m are independent from those with i ≤ m,
entailing Xn − Xm ⊥ Fm. Moreover, any {ωi = H} for i ≤ m is clearly Fm measurable.
We then leverage Theorem 2.43 to compute the conditional expectation required for
martingality: let m < n ∈N, then
E[Xn | Fm] = E[Xm | Fm] + E[Xn − Xm | Fm] = Xm︸︷︷︸
Xm∈Fm
+E[Xn − Xm]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xn−Xm⊥Fm
= Xm.
As the last computation suggests, martingales can also be characterized in terms of
their increments:
Proposition 2.46. An adapted, integrable process is a martingale if and only if, for each
s ≤ t ∈ I,




The goal of this chapter is to describe the categorical semantics of higher-order intu-
itionistic theories, which are higher-order languages equipped with the proof calculus
of intuitionistic logic. Although with a marginally different notation, such calculus is
described in [Jacobs 2005, Figure 4.1].
3.1 Triposes
The scaffolding for the semantics we are going to use is fibrational, meaning we take
quite literally the expression ‘predicate over a context’ by assigning a (Heyting) pre-
algebra of formulae to every ‘context’ of a category. This can be done in the obvious
way, yielding a functor as in the definition below, or dually, yielding what would actu-
ally be a fibration of categories. As the two approaches are equivalent (thanks to the
Grothendieck construction), we follow what we deem the more intuitive approach and
we don’t elaborate further on the matter.
Definition 3.1. Let C be a category with finite products. A C-tripos is a pseudofunctor
Cop PreOrdP
such that:
1. It factors through PreHey ↪→ PreOrd, the category of Heyting prealgebras.
2. For every morphism X
f→ Y in C, there’s a string of adjoints:
∃ f a f ∗ a ∀ f
where we set f ∗ := P f .
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4. For every object Y : C, there is an object π(Y) : C and an element ∈Y ∈ P(Y ×
π(Y)) having the following property: for every object Γ : C and element ϕ ∈
P(Y× Γ), there is an arrow {ϕ} : Γ→ π(Y) such that
(1Y × {ϕ})∗(∈Y) ' ϕ. (3.1.1)
Remark 3.1.1. The definition of tripos might appear rather obscure at first but, as antic-
ipated, has a very lucid intuition behind: a tripos embodies C with a certain higher-
order predicate logic.
The objects PX play the rôle of Lindenbaum–Tarski algebras of formulae over X.
Indeed, it is customary to refer to elements of PX as P-predicates. The morphisms
f ∗ : PY → PX stand for substitution arrows, (ideally) sending a predicate ϕ [y :Y] over
Y to the predicate ϕ[y/ f (x)] [x : X] over X.
The adjoints ∃ f and ∀ f are, as one might have already guessed, simply existential
and universal quantifiers, respectively (actually, they are slightly more general: the
quantifiers we are accustomed to are adjoints to π∗X, for a projection morphism πX :
X×Y → X).
The condition of Beck and Chevalley, as mysterious as it may look, is simply a
necessary commutativity condition between existential quantification and substitution.
Moreover, it follows from the axioms the dual Beck–Chevalley condition holds too: for
a pullback like that in the definition we have
∀g f ∗ ' h∗ ∀k.
Finally, the fourth and most cryptic axiom can be interpreted in the following way:
we want π(Y) to play the rôle of the object of ‘definable subobjects of Y’, and ∈Y to
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star as the membership predicate. Such a pair is called a weak power object of P for
Y [Pasquali 2016]. Then the axiom prescribes the defining property of such a pair, by
imposing that any predicate on Y, possibly dependent on a context given by Γ, actually
defines a subobject of Y for every x : Γ. Indeed, if we imagine that a morphism f ∗ acts as
a substitution, the axiom is saying:
“y ∈Y {ϕ}(x) is logically equivalent to ϕ(x, y)”.
Compare this to the rules for the type of propositions of a higher-order language
(cf. (1.3.12) and (1.3.13)). In this sense, weak power objects ‘reify’ predicates.
Remark 3.1.2. Pseudofunctors satisfying only the first three axioms are called (Lawvere)
hyperdoctrines. They’re the analogous of triposes for first-order predicate logic. Indeed,
they lack exactly the axiom which enables higher-order reasoning in the tripos. This
means much of the following theory works for hyperdoctrines too, once one peels off
the parts pertaining higher-order logic.
Remark 3.1.3. The requirement to have both adjoints to every map f ∗ : PY → PX can
actually be simplified, since one can build ∃ f and ∀ f with ∃πY , ∀πY and ∃∆Y : for all
ϕ ∈ PX,
∃ f (ϕ) ' ∃πY (( f × 1Y)
∗(∃∆Y (>P(Y×Y))) ∧ π
∗
X(ϕ)),





We stress the importance of the predicate ∃∆Y (>P(Y×Y)). One might call this the
external equality predicate on Y, and for this reason we’ll denote it by =Y, or simply
=. In general, it holds that




1 (ϕ) ∧>Y) = π∗1 (ϕ) ∧ ∃∆Y (>Y). (3.1.3)
Example 3.2. It is well-known any simply-typed language L can be turned into a category
with products S[L], called its syntactic category, roughly as follows:
1. its objects are contexts considered up to ‘α-equivalence’, i.e. renaming of variables,
hence lists of types;
2. morphisms [~x :~Γ] t→ [~y :~∆] are lists of terms
~t :~∆ [~x :~Γ] :≡ t1 : ∆1 [~x :~Γ], . . . , tn : ∆n [~x :~Γ]
where n is the length of ~∆;
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3. the composite of [~x :~Γ] t→ [~y :~∆] and [~y :~∆] s→ [~z :~Θ] is given by substitution:
(~s :~Θ) [~y :~∆] ◦ (~t :~∆) [~x :~Γ] := (~s[~y/~t] :~Θ) [~x :~Γ];
4. identities are given by the same list of variables appearing in the context:
1[~x:~Γ] = ~x :~Γ [~x :~Γ];
5. and finally, binary products are given by concatenation of lists:
[~x :~Γ]× [~y :~∆] = [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆]
with projections simply given by the list of variables appearing in the target
context; and the terminal object is the empty context [ ]. Of course, we suppose
the variables appearing in ~x :~Γ and those appearing in ~y :~∆ are distinct.
For a more detailed account of S[L], see [Pitts 1989]. Suppose now L is actually higher-
order (see Definition 1.12) with propositional equality, and make it into a theory L
by choosing an intuitionistic proof calculus. Then the above motivation takes a literal
meaning if we define the pseudofunctor:
S[L]op PreOrd
[~x :~Γ] (LTL(~x :~Γ), `~x:~Γ)




which is a tripos since
1. LTL(~x :~Γ) is the Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra of propositions in context Γ, ordered
by the entailment relation `Γ, thus a Heyting prealgebra as remarked before.
2. The morphism t∗ induced by~t :~∆ [~x :~Γ] is defined by substitution:
t∗(ϕ [~y :~∆]) := (ϕ [~y/~t]) [~x :~Γ].
3. The adjoints of t∗ are obtained by using the actual quantifiers of L:
∃t(ψ [~x :~Γ]) := ∃~x :~Γ (~t(~x) = ~y ∧ ψ(~x)),
∀t(ψ [~x :~Γ]) := ∀~x :~Γ (~t(~x) = ~y→ ψ(~x)).
Notice equality too is crucial to their definition.
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4. The weak power object of a context [~y :~∆] is given by
π[~y :~∆] := [σ :~∆→ Prop],
with membership predicate:
∈[~y:~∆] := ~y ∈~∆ σ [~y :~∆, σ :~∆→ Prop].
So every ϕ [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆] in LTL(~x :~Γ) determines a term
[~x :~Γ]
{ϕ}−→ π[~y :~∆] := {~y :~∆ | ϕ} :~∆→ Prop [~x :~Γ]
so that
(1[~y:~∆] × {ϕ})
∗(∈[~y:~∆]) ' (~y ∈~∆ {~y :~∆ | ϕ}) [~y :~∆,~x :~Γ] ' ϕ [~y :~∆,~x :~Γ]
as formulae by rule (1.3.13), and since judgmentally equal formulae are logically
equivalent.
Remark 3.2.1. As noted in Remark 1.12.2, a higher-order language as defined in Defi-
nition 1.12 does not have all function types. This is easily seen to be equivalent to the
fact that its syntactic category S[L] does not admit every exponential (only exponentials
[~x :~Γ]→ [σ :Prop] are present), hence it is not cartesian closed. This remark is of interest
since the axiom of weak power objects seems to naturally impose cartesian closure on
the base category of the tripos (and indeed, Pitts initially asked this in the definition of
tripos), yet this is actually not true, as this example testifies.
Example 3.3. Let H be a complete Heyting algebra. A prominent example of tripos is
the following:
Setop PreOrd





The ordering `X is the pointwise ordering of the maps X →H, f ∗ acts by precomposi-
tion, and the adjoints are given by
∃ f (ϕ)(y) =
∨
{ϕ(x) | f (x) = y}
∀ f (ϕ)(y) =
∧
{ϕ(x) | f (x) = y}.
Notice completeness of H is essential for the definition of these. Finally, weak power
objects π(X) are simply HX , with membership predicate ∈X given by evaluation, and
representations {ϕ} obtained by currying.
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Example 3.4. If E is an elementary topos, the functor Sub : Eop → PreOrd is a tripos.
This is expounded in [Moerdijk and MacLane 1992, Chapter IV]. In fact:
1. For any X :E , (Sub X,⊆) is a Heyting algebra1, where
(a) U ⊆ V, for U, V ∈ Sub X, means there is a monic U V in E/X.
(b) The arrows 0
?X→ X and X 1X→ X, both monic, are the bottom and top
element, respectively.
(c) The meet U ∩V of two subobjects U, V ∈ Sub X is given by pulling back
any of the two along the other.
(d) The join U ∪ V of two subobjects U, V ∈ Sub X is given by the image of
the universal morphism U + V → X (which exists since a topos admits
epi-mono factorization).
(e) Since SubE X ∼= SubE/X(1), and the exponential of two subterminal ob-
jects is again subterminal, we get an implication operator.
Observe that, since Ω represents Sub, it follows ΩX is an internal Heyting algebra
(in the sense of Definition 1.3).
2. Morphisms X
f→ Y lift by pullback to maps Sub Y f
∗
→ Sub X. By direct calculation
one shows these maps preserve the Heyting structure just described. Moreover,
they have both adjoints:
(a) The left adjoint Sub X




In [Moerdijk and MacLane 1992, Section IV.9] it is proved ∃ f satisfy the
Beck–Chevalley condition.
(b) The right adjoint Sub X
∀ f→ Sub Y is harder to describe. First, one actually
defines a right adjoint ∏ f for f ∗ : E/Y → E/X. In case Y = 1, ∏ f (U
h→
X) is morally the subobject of UX given by right inverses of h. One then
generalizes to arbitrary Y by noticing (E/Y)/( f ) ∼= E/X. Then, since
1It should be first remarked Sub X is a set, and not a proper class. This follows from the fact E is locally
small and Sub is represented by ΩE .
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∏ f is a right adjoint, it preserves monicity implying its restriction to
Sub X → Sub Y is well-defined. This whole construction is carried out in
detail [Moerdijk and MacLane 1992, Theorem I.9.4] and [Moerdijk and
MacLane 1992, Proposition IV.9.3].
3. At last, weak power objects are obtained by taking π(X) to be ΩX and ∈X to be
the subobject EX  X ×ΩX classified by evΩX . Then for any ϕ : U  Γ× X,
define {ϕ} : Γ → ΩX to be the exponential transpose of the classifying map
χϕ : Γ× X → Ω of ϕ. Finally, one has to prove the mono ϕ′ : U′  X × Γ one
gets by pulling back ∈X along 1X × {ϕ} is isomorphic to ϕ itself. Consider the
following diagram:
U′ EX 1








where both squares are pullbacks. By pasting property of pullbacks and since
the bottom triangle commutes by definition of {ϕ} as exponential transpose, we
get ϕ′ ∼= ϕ.
3.2 Semantics in a tripos
In this section, we’ll formalize the intuition that triposes are tailor-made for interpreting
higher-order intuitionistic theories. The following is loosely informed by [Van Oosten
2008, Subsection 2.1.3] and [Pitts 1989].
Definition 3.5. Let L be a higher-order language as in Definition 1.12. An interpretation
J− K of L in the C-tripos P assigns
1. to each type X, an object J X K of C, while a finite list of types ~X is canonically
sent to
J ~X K := J X1 K× · · · × J Xn K,
and we recall the nullary product is the terminal object 1;
2. to each relation symbol R of signature ~X, a P-predicate
J R K ∈ PJ ~X K,
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3. to each function symbol F of signature ~X and type Y, a morphism of C:
J ~X K J Y K.
J F K
We only require that for any propositional type ~∆→ Prop,
J~∆→ Prop K = πJ~∆ K, J∈~∆ K = ∈J~∆ K.
We can then extend this assignment to terms and formulae of L. For convenience,
fix a context ~x :~Γ of length n. Each term t :Y [~x :~Γ] will be sent to a morphism of C:
J~Γ K J Y K,
J t:Y[~x:~Γ] K
while each formula ϕ [~x :~Γ] becomes a P-predicate:
J ϕ [~x :~Γ] K ∈ PJ~Γ K.
Interpretation of terms is inductively defined as follows:
1. for variables in context,
J xi : Γi [~x :~Γ] K := πi,
where πi : J~Γ K→ J Γi K is the projection morphism;
2. if F is a function symbol with signature ~Z with length m and type Y, and t1 : Z1 [~x :
~Γ], . . ., tm : Zm [~x :~Γ] are terms in context,
J F(t1, . . . , tm) [~x :~Γ] K := J F K ◦ 〈J t1 : Z1 [~x :~Γ] K, . . . , J tm : Zm [~x :~Γ] K〉;
3. if ϕ [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆] is a formula, then
J {~y :~∆ | ϕ} :~∆→ Prop [~x :~Γ] K := {J ϕ [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆] K} (3.2.1)
where {J ϕ [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆] K} : J~Γ K→ πJ~∆ K denotes the morphism associated to the
P-predicate J ϕ [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆] K by the fourth tripos axiom.
Interpretation of formulae is inductively defined as well:
1. to the true and false formulae, we assign:
J false [~x :~Γ] K := ⊥PJ~Γ K,
J true [~x :~Γ] K := >PJ~Γ K.
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2. if R is a relation symbol of signature ~Z with length m, and t1 : Z1 [~x : ~Γ], . . .,
tm : Zm [~x :~Γ] are terms,
J R(t1, . . . , tm) [~x :~Γ] K := 〈J t1 : Z1 [~x :~Γ] K, . . . , J tm : Zm [~x :~Γ] K〉∗J R K.
3. if ϕ [~x :~Γ] and ψ [~x :~Γ] are formulae,
J (ϕ ∧ ψ) [~x :~Γ] K := J ϕ [~x :~Γ] K∧ J ψ [~x :~Γ] K,
J (ϕ ∨ ψ) [~x :~Γ] K := J ϕ [~x :~Γ] K∨ J ψ [~x :~Γ] K,
J (ϕ→ ψ) [~x :~Γ] K := J ϕ [~x :~Γ] K⇒ J ψ [~x :~Γ] K,
where the operators appearing on the right side are those of the Heyting prealge-
bra PJ~Γ K;
4. if ϕ [~x :~Γ, z : Z] is a formula, then
J (∃z : Z ϕ) [~x :~Γ] K := ∃πΓJ ϕ [~x :~Γ, z : Z] K,
J (∀z : Z ϕ) [~x :~Γ] K := ∀πΓJ ϕ [~x :~Γ, z : Z] K,
where πΓ : J~Γ K× J Z K→ J~Γ K is the projection morphism.
Following the same induction used to prove Lemma 1.11, Corollary 1.11.1 and
Corollary 1.11.2, we can prove the following:
Lemma 3.6 (Semantics of substitution). Let t : Y [~x :~Γ] and s : Z[y : Y] be terms in context,
and let ϕ [y :Y] is a formula in context. Then
J (s[y/t] : Z [~x :~Γ]) K = J s : Z[y :Y] K ◦ J t :Y [~x :~Γ] K,
J (ϕ [t/y]) [~x :~Γ] K = J t :Y [~x :~Γ] K
∗
(J ϕ [y :Y] K).
Corollary 3.6.1 (Semantics of weakening). Let t : Z [~x :~Γ] be a term in context ϕ [~x :~Γ] a
formula in context, and let ~y :~∆ be another context. Then
J t : Z[~x :~Γ,~y :~∆] K = J t : Z [~x :~Γ] K ◦ πΓ,
J ϕ [~x :~Γ,~y :~∆] K = π∗ΓJ ϕ [~x :~Γ] K,
where πΓ : J~Γ K× J~∆ K→ J~Γ K is the projection morphism.
Corollary 3.6.2 (Semantics of permutation). Let ~x : ~Γ be a context of length n and σ a
permutation of {1, ..., n}. Denote with ~x′ :~Γ′ the context define as
x′σ(i) : Γ
′
σ(i) := xi : Γi.
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Moreover, let t : Z [~x :~Γ] be a term in context ϕ [~x :~Γ] a formula in context. Then
J t : Z[~x′ :~Γ′] K = J t : Z [~x :~Γ] K ◦ 〈σ〉,
J ϕ [~x :~Γ] K = 〈σ〉∗J ϕ [~x :~Γ] K,
where 〈σ〉 : J~Γ′ K→ J~Γ K is the arrow 〈πσ(1), ..., πσ(n)〉.
Given an interpretation of L, we can define validity for predicates:
Definition 3.7. Let L be a higher-order language and J− K an interpretation of L in the
C-tripos P. Let ϕ [~x :~Γ] be an L-formula. Then we define
P J− K ϕ [~x :~Γ] iff ∀!J ϕ [~x :~Γ] K ' >P1
and we read it “ϕ [~x :~Γ] is valid in P relative to J− K” or “P satisfies ϕ [~x :~Γ] relative to
J− K”.
Remark 3.7.1. The map ∀! is the universal closure operator, the right adjoint to !∗, where
! : J~Γ K → 1 is the unique morphism existing by terminality of 1. In simpler terms, it
quantifies away all the free variables occurring in ϕ:
∀!J ϕ [~x :~Γ] K ' J ∀x1 : X1, . . . xn : Xn (ϕ)[ ] K.
It is equivalent to define
P J− K ϕ [~x :~Γ] iff J ϕ [~x :~Γ] K ' >PJ~Γ K.
The most important result of this section is the following:
Theorem 3.8 (Soundness Theorem Van Oosten 2008, Theorem 2.1.6). Let L be a typed
relational language and J− K an interpretation of L in a tripos P. Let ϕ be an L-sentence. If ϕ
is provable in higher-order intuitionistic logic, then P |=J− K ϕ.
Corollary 3.8.1. Let L be a typed relational language and J− K an interpretation of L in a
tripos P. Let ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ be L-sentences. Suppose P satisfies the L-sentences ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn
relative to J− K, and suppose ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . ϕn entail ψ in higher-order intuitionistic logic. Then P
satisfies ψ relative to J− K.
A C-tripos can also be used syntactically, to ‘put a logic on C’. In fact any C-tripos P
defines a canonical higher-order languageL[P] (the internal language of P) whose types
are objects of C, function symbols are morphisms of C, and weak power objects function
as propositional types. This language has then an obvious canonical interpretation in P.
This allows to manipulate the objects and arrows of C as if we were speaking of sets
and functions. Moreover, the Soundness Theorem implies we are also able to carry out
intuitionistic proofs in this language.
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3.3 Tripos-to-topos construction
The fact L[P] makes possible to ‘pretend to work with sets’ is remindful of what happens
with topoi and their internal logic. Indeed, triposes and topoi are strongly linked
together. In the words of Pitts [Pitts 2002]:
The main use for triposes seems to occur when one has some non-
standard notion of predicate and one wishes to see that it can be used
to generate a topos.
Throughout this section, we’ll use the language of a fixed C-tripos P, along with its
canonical interpretation J− K, with the goal of decluttering definitions and making more
apparent the rationale behind them, which is to simply go and define a topos of ‘sets
according to P’.
Definition 3.9. The category of partial equivalence relations (PERs) C[P] associated
to P is defined in the following way:
1. An object is a pair (X,∼) where X : C and ∼ ∈ P(X× X) satisfies the axioms of a
partial equivalence relation in the language of P (we abuse notation by using infix
notation):
(symmetric) P |= x ∼ y→ y ∼ x [x, y : X],
(transitive) P |= x ∼ y ∧ y ∼ z→ x ∼ z [x, y, z : X].
(3.3.1)
This is called the equality predicate of (X,∼). Notice that by virtue of partiality,
an equality predicate also specifies which ‘elements’ of X ‘really belong’ to (X,∼),
namely those x in X for which x ∼ x holds; and the exact degree to which this
holds specifies how much they belong to (X,∼).
2. A morphism (X,∼X)
F→ (Y,∼Y) is an equivalence class of F ∈ P(X×Y) which
satisfy the axioms of a functional relation with respect to the equality predicates
of its domain and codomain:
(strict) P |= F(x, y)→ x ∼X x ∧ y ∼Y y [x : X, y :Y]
(relational) P |= F(x, y) ∧ x ∼X x′ ∧ y ∼Y y′ → F(x′, y′) [x, x′ : X, y, y′ :Y],
(single valued) P |= F(x, y) ∧ F(x, y′)→ y ∼Y y′ [x : X, y, y′ :Y],
(total) P |= x ∼X x → ∃y :Y F(x, y) [x : X].
(3.3.2)
The equivalence is the posetal equivalence of P(X×Y).
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3. The identity of (X,∼) is the equivalence class of ∼ itself.
4. The composite of (X,∼X)
F→ (Y,∼Y)
G→ (Z,∼Z) is given by
J ∃y :Y (F(x, y) ∧ G(y, z)) [x : X, z : Z] K.
It is straightforward to show the above definition actually gives a category, by
employing soundness of P with respect to intuitionistic logic (Theorem 3.8) to do the
necessary computations.
Remark 3.9.1. Notice we didn’t use weak power objects in the definition of C[P], and
that the definition only needs first-order constructs to work. In fact, any hyperdoctrine
defines a category of partial equivalence relations.
Lemma 3.10. Consider the category of PERs C[P] arising from a tripos2, and let (X,∼) be
an object. Then every subobject of (X,∼) can be presented by a strict relation on (X,∼), i.e. a
predicate ϕ ∈ PX such that
(strict) P |= ϕ(x)→ x ∼ x [x : X]
(relational) P |= ϕ(x) ∧ x ∼ x′ → ϕ(x′) [x, x′ : X].
(3.3.3)
Proof. The correspondence between subobjects and strict relations goes like this. First,
to a mono (Y,≈)
F
 (X,∼X) we can associate the predicate
ϕF := ∃πX F = J ∃y :Y F(y, x) [x : X] K.
It is relational because F is and strict because F is. Conversely, if ϕ ∈ PX is strict on
(X,∼) then we define
∼ϕ := ∃∆X (ϕ) = J x ∼ x
′ ∧ ϕ(x) [x, x′ : X] K. (3.3.4)




Finally, the two correspondences can be seen to be one inverse of the other rather easily:
clearly
∃πX (∼ϕ) = J ∃x
′ : X (x ∼ x′ ∧ ϕ(x)) [x : X] K = ϕ
while
(X,∼∃πX F) = (X, J x ∼ x
′ ∧ ∃y :Y F(y, x) [x, x′ : X] K)
is isomorphic to (Y,≈) through F itself, considered as a morphism (Y,≈)→ (X,∼∃πX F).
2Or any hyperdoctine, for that matter.
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As anticipated, the internal logic of a tripos has enough expressive power to provide
C[P] with all the necessary structure to become a topos:
Theorem 3.11 (Pitts 1982). For a tripos P, the category C[P] is an elementary topos, called the
Pitts’ topos of P.
Sketch of proof. Indeed:
1. C[P] has finite limits.
(a) The terminal object is given by
(1,>P(1×1))
where 1 is the terminal object of C.
(b) The product of (X,∼X) and (Y,∼Y) is (X×Y, ∼X×Y), where
∼X×Y := J x ∼X x′ ∧ y ∼Y y′ [〈x, y〉, 〈x′, y′〉 : X×Y] K
together with the projection morphisms
πX := J x ∼X x′ ∧ y ∼Y y [〈x, y〉 : X×Y, x′ : X] K,
πY := J x ∼X x ∧ y ∼Y y′ [〈x, y〉 : X×Y, y′ :Y] K.







E := ≈ := J x ∼X x′ ∧ ∃y :Y (F(x, y) ∧ G(x′, y)) [x, x′ : X] K.
2. C[P] is cartesian closed. The exponential (Y,∼Y)(X,∼X) is given by the object
(π(X×Y),∼), where
∼ := J FR(F) ∧ ∀x : X ∀y :Y (〈x, y〉 ∈X×Y F ↔ 〈x, y〉 ∈X×Y G) [F, G : π(X×Y)] K.
(3.3.6)
along with the evaluation map
evYX := J 〈x, y〉 ∈X×Y F [x : X, F : π(X×Y), y :Y] K. (3.3.7)
In the above definition, FR is a P-predicate expressing the fact F is a functional
relation. It is basically the conjunction of the conditions (3.3.2).
3. C[P] has a subobject classifier. It is the arrow t : 1→ (Σ,⇔), where Σ = π(1),
⇔ := π∗1 (∈1)→ π∗2 (∈1) ∧ π∗2 (∈1)→ π∗1 (∈1), (3.3.8)
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and π1, π2 : Σ× Σ→ Σ are the two projections. The effect of such a map is really
to give the logical double implication, as
〈{ϕ}, {ψ}〉∗(⇔) ' ϕ↔ ψ, for all ϕ, ψ ∈ PX.
To see this is really a subobject classifier, we can leverage Lemma 3.10 and show t
can classify subobjects of type (X,∼ϕ) (X,∼): such a subobject is classified
by the morphism (X,∼)→ (Σ,⇔) defined as
χϕ := J x ∼ x ∧ ({ϕ}(x)⇔ σ) [x : X, σ : Σ] K. (3.3.9)
Remark 3.11.1. We specified ‘elementary’ because not every topos obtained in this way
is a Grothendieck3 topos. The most celebrated of these is the effective topos Ef f , which
can be obtained as the category of partial equivalence relations associated to a certain
Set-tripos. More about this can be found in [Van Oosten 2008, Chapter 3].
Remark 3.11.2. If P were only an hyperdoctrine, the category C[P] would only be a
Heyting category, which is a category whose internal logic is first-order intuitionistic.
In [Pitts 2002, Theorem 4.2], Pitts gives a necessary and sufficient condition on an
hyperdoctrine P for its category of partial equivalence relations to be a topos:
Axiom (Comprehension Axiom, [Pitts 2002, Axiom 4.1]). For all objects Y : C there is an
object π(Y) : C and a P-predicate ∈Y ∈ P(Y× π(Y)) such that, for any Γ : C and P-predicate
ϕ ∈ P(Y× Γ),
P |= ∀x : Γ ∃{ϕ} : π(Y) ∀y :Y (x ∈Y {ϕ} ↔ ϕ(y, x)). (3.3.10)
As noted in the article, the fourth axiom of triposes is but a Skolemization of this
axiom, which means every tripos satisfies the Comprehension Axiom. On the other
hand, the converse is not true! An example of such an hyperdoctrine is the FinSet-tripos
of B-valued (finite) sets, for an infinite complete Boolean algebra B [Pitts 2002, Example
4.8]4. An hyperdoctrine satisfying the comprehension axiom is sometimes called a
moral tripos, e.g. by Streicher [Streicher 2011], in contrast with traditional triposes.
3A topos is Grothendieck if it is equivalent to the topos of sheaves over a site, i.e. over a small category
C equipped with a family of ‘covering sieves’ for each of its objects, which satisfy axioms inspired by the
properties of open covers in a topological space.
4In short, for a finite set Y, π(Y) is taken to be {>,⊥}Y and ∈Y is just function application, and then one
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Example 3.12. Recall Example 3.3, where we defined the tripos of H-valued sets (or
simply H-sets) for a complete Heyting algebra H. Pitts’ construction on the tripos of
H-sets yields a topos whose internal logic has H as its object of truth values, i.e. as
subobject classifier. Since complete Heyting algebras are locales, every localic topos5
arise from such a tripos. In particular:
Theorem 3.13. The topos of H-sets Set[H(−)] is equivalent to the topos of sheaves on H,
equipped with the topology of jointly epimorphic morphisms6.
Idea behind the proof. A detailed account of this proof can be found in [Johnstone 2002,
Section C1.3], where it is proved the equivalence between sheaves on H, local homeo-
morphism over H and H-sets.
One starts defining the equivalence by turning a presheaf F : Hop → Set into an
H-set




s ∼ F t :=
∨
{h ≤ k ∧ ` | s|h ≡ t|h}, for s ∈ F (k), t ∈ F (`). (3.3.11)
This definition is very close in spirit7 to that of the étale space of F , whereby one glues
together all sections of F using the glueing instructions provided by F itself, in the
form of its restriction morphisms8. Finally, maps F
f→ G are sent to (with abuse of
notation Θ(F ), Θ(G ) will denote the carrier sets):
Θ( f ) : Θ(F )×Θ(G ) −→H
(s, t) 7−→ s ∼G f (s).
(3.3.12)
Routine computations show Θ is actually a functor Psh H→ Set[H(−)]. To conclude,
one restricts Θ to sheaves.























5A topos is localic if it is equivalent to the topos of sheaves on a locale. See [Moerdijk and MacLane 1992,
Chapter 9] for an extensive treatment of this class of topoi.
6This means that a family of elements {hi}i∈I of H covers an element h ∈ H iff hi ≤ h for all i ∈ I, and
h ≤ ∨i∈I hi
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Then one can show images of sheaves under Θ are complete H-sets. Roughly, and
H-set (X,∼) is complete if one can extract a precise element from any of its singletons.
We defer a more formal discussion on singletons and the object of singletons associated
to an H-set to the proof of Theorem 3.18. To our aim, it suffices to say completeness
allows one to reason about singletons and then pass to elements straightforwardly.
For instance, if (X,∼X) is complete, then one can define a presheaf:
Hop Set
h {x ∈ X | x ∼X x = h}





Indeed, since a singleton is a subobject of (X,∼X), it is represented by a function
X → H. If {x} is such a function, then {x} ∧ h (for h ∈ H) is a subobject and one can
show it is again a singleton. Completeness allows us to say it is the singleton associated
to an element of (X,∼X), which we aptly name x|h. This defines restrictions.
Likewise, one can use completeness to show a family of compatible sections {si ∈
Θ−1(X,∼X)(hi)}i∈I glues to a common patching, since the function x 7→
∨
i∈I si ∼X x
is a singleton and therefore comes from an element s ∈ ∨i∈I hi. This proves Θ−1(X,∼X)
is actually a sheaf.
Lastly, if (X,∼X)
f→ (Y,∼Y) is a map between complete H-sets, one can construct
Θ−1( f ) simply by lifting f to singletons and then, by completeness, getting a map X →
Y which can be shown to be such that x ∼X x = f (x) ∼X f (x) [Johnstone 2002, Lemma
C1.3.8]. Therefore it defines a natural transformation Θ−1(X,∼X)→ Θ−1(Y,∼Y) ( fh is
f for each h ∈H, suitably restricted).
The final piece of the puzzle is given by the fact every H-set is functorially isomorphic
to a complete one [Johnstone 2002, Lemma C1.3.9]. Therefore the construction of Θ−1
on complete H-sets suffices to define an inverse to Θ. To prove Θ and Θ−1 are inverses
is a trivial computation.
Example 3.14. We’ll show later on that the Pitts’ topos associated to the tripos of
subobjects of an elementary topos E (Example 3.4) is equivalent to the E we started with.
7Indeed, as shown in [Johnstone 2002, p. 509], one can construct a local homeomorphism of locales using
this exact idea. Hence the definition of Θ(F) is precisely the H-set version of the étale space of F.
8The final picture recalls a lasagna, with large sheets of pasta on the bottom corresponding to global section
and grated cheese on top corresponding to germs at points of H.
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3.3.1 Constant objects
In the tripos-to-topos construction, it is paramount to supply an equality predicate
in defining the objects of C[P], since this makes equality governed by the logic of P.
However, ‘external’ equality is always there, and can be invoked if necessary. This gives
a way to embed C in C[P]: define
∇P(X) := (X,=X) (3.3.14)
where =X stands for ∃∆X (>PX) (see remark 3.1.3). The assignment ∇P extends to
morphisms: just send X
f→ Y to
∇P( f ) := ∃〈1X , f 〉(>PX) ' P( f × 1Y)(=Y) ' J f (x) = y [x : X, y :Y] K. (3.3.15)
Hence ∇P becomes a functor C → C[P], known as the functor of constant objects,
which can also be shown to be left exact.
Its image is basically an internal copy of C. However, in general C[P] is much bigger.
First of all, we only require C to have products, hence it’s not reasonable to expect its
copy to be a full-fledged topos. Moreover, since we equipped objects of C with synthetic
equality predicates governed by the logic of P, C[P] can be a far more exotic zoo.
Still, constant objects enjoy a privileged relationship with their host topos.
Proposition 3.15 (Van Oosten 2008, Proposition 2.4.3). Every object of C[P] is the subquo-
tient of a constant object.
Proof. It is straightforward: for a given (X,∼), take (X,=∆∗(∼)) with the epimorphism
given by =∆∗(∼) itself.
Intuitively, (X,=∆∗(∼)) is a ‘discrete’ version of X, where the possibly nuanced
equality ∼ is replaced by an ‘all-or-nothing’ predicate. We keep the same elements
however (in the sense of those x ∈ X for which reflexivity of the equality predicates
holds), they are just less ‘cohesive’.
Finally, one can take Proposition 3.15 one step further and prove C[P] is equivalent to
the so-called ex/reg completion of the full subcategory AssC(P) of subobjects of constant
objects, which roughly means C[P] is universal among the categories containing AssC(P)
and admitting all quotients of internal equivalence relations [Van Oosten 2008, Corollary
2.4.5].
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3.4 Morphisms of triposes
There are a bunch of different notions of morphism between triposes. The most basic
of them is that of pseudonatural transformation Φ : P → Q, where both P and Q are
triposes on the same base C. This is unsatisfactory, however, since morphisms usually
preserve some amount of structure.
Hence one can start putting conditions on the pseudonatural transformation Φ.
There are now two paths one can follow to come up with a sensible list of conditions.
The first is to mimic morphisms of topoi. This makes sense since, as we’ve seen, triposes
and topoi are cognate structures (this will become even more evident a posteriori). The
second is to ask the morphisms to preserve structure, or, equivalently, to respect the
kind of higher-order semantics one can do in triposes.
We’ll follow both paths, and see how they actually cross.
3.4.1 Geometric morphisms
Definition 3.16. A geometric morphism of C-triposes Φ : P→ Q is an adjoint pair




such that Φ+ preserves finite meets (componentwise).
The definition, of course, echoes the homonymous notion of morphism of topoi,
which we recall here:





such that f ∗ is left exact (i.e. preserves finite limits).
In both cases, we’ll call the left part of the adjunction inverse image part and the
right one the direct image part.
Theorem 3.18 (Van Oosten 2008, Theorem 2.5.8(i)). Every geometric morphism Φ : P→ Q
of triposes induces a geometric morphism Φ : C[P] → C[Q] between the corresponding Pitts
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Sketch of proof. First of all, we construct the inverse image part of Φ. Notice that Φ+,
being a left adjoint commutes with left adjoints in PreOrd, in particular for every
f : X → Y in C, if ∃Pf a P f and ∃
Q
f a Q f , then by taking the left adjoint on both sides of








Now let (X,∼) be an object of C[Q]. Since Φ+ preserves finite meets, (X, Φ+X×X(∼
)) is a well-defined object of C[P], because Φ+X×X(∼) is again a partial equivalence
relation. Moreover, Φ+ preserves existential quantification, hence functional relations
F ∈ Q(X×Y) are sent to functional relations Φ+X×Y(F) ∈ P(X×Y), meaning the latter
is a well-defined arrow (X, Φ+X×X(∼))→ (Y, Φ
+
Y×Y(∼)) in C[P]. Eventually, we defined
a functor Φ∗ : C[Q] → C[P]. It commutes with finite limits since those are defined in
terms of meets and existential quantifiers alone. Finally, for the same reason one can
show this functor preserves constant objects.
The construction of the direct image is more involved. The problem is, one can-
not directly lift a functional relation F from (X,∼) to (Y,∼) to a functional relation
from (X, Φ+(∼)) to (Y, Φ+(∼)): Φ+(F) is not necessarily total anymore (Φ+ doesn’t
commute on the nose with existential quantifiers).
To bypass this problem, one instead considers the ‘object of singletons’ (π(X),∼S)
associated to a given object (X,∼) of C[P]:
SX := J ∃x : X(x ∼ x ∧ ∀x′ : X(x′ ∈X U ↔ x ∼ x′)) [U : π(X)] K,
∼S :=⇔SX := J SX(U) ∧ ∀x : X(x ∈X U ↔ x ∈X V) [U, V : π(X)] K.
(3.4.2)
The predicate SX is the singleton predicate for (X,∼): it’s satisfied by those subobjects
whose elements are all equal (so-called subsingletons) and which are inhabited9. The
9Normally (in Set) subsingletons are either singletons or the empty set, but in a more general context
non-singletons subsingletons can be non-empty yet not inhabited, hence the ‘inhabitation condition’ is
important.
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relation ∼S is defined as to pick the subobject of P (X,∼) consisting of singleton subob-
jects of (X,∼), in the sense of P. Trivially, the object (π(X),∼S) is isomorphic to (X,∼)
via:
IX := J x ∼ x ∧ ∀x′ : X(x′ ∈X U ↔ x ∼ x′) [x : X, U : π(X)] K
Now a functional relation (π(X),∼S)
F→ (π(Y),∼S) gets sent to a total functional
relation (π(X), Φ+(∼S))
Φ+(F)−→ (π(Y), Φ+(∼S)) [Van Oosten 2008, Lemma 2.5.7]. Thus
we set
Φ∗(X,∼) := (π(X), Φ+(∼S))
and given an arrow (X,∼)→ (Y,∼), we first make it into an arrow
(π(X),∼S)→ (π(Y),∼S)
by pre- and postcomposing it with the isomorphisms IX and I−1Y , respectively; and then
we apply Φ+ to get an arrow (π(X), Φ+(∼))→ (π(Y), Φ+(∼S)).
At last, one shows functoriality of this construction and proves the adjunction
Φ∗ a Φ∗ through routine computations.
Remark 3.18.1. Van Oosten also proves the converse statement [Van Oosten 2008, Theo-
rem 2.5.8(ii)]: every
geometric morphism C[P]→ C[Q] whose inverse image part preserve constant objects
is induced by an essentially unique geometric morphism of triposes P→ Q.
3.4.2 Logical morphisms
The morphisms we discuss here are naturally defined between triposes over (possibly)
different bases, thus for the rest of the section fix two triposes P : Cop → PreOrd and
Q : Dop → PreOrd.
Definition 3.19. A first-order logical morphism of triposes is a pair (F, Φ) where
1. F : C→ D is a functor preserving finite products,
2. Φ : P→ QF is a pseudonatural transformation
such that
1. every component ΦX : PX → QFX is a morphism of Heyting prealgebras,
2. for all morphisms f : X → Y in C, Φ commutes with ∃ f and ∀ f , i.e.
ΦY ∃Pf ' ∃
Q




F f ΦX .
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Remark 3.19.1. In the proof of Theorem 3.18, we’ve managed to get commutation of Φ+
and ∃ by exploiting the fact Φ+ was a left adjoint. This technique shows that if Φ+ a Φ+
is a geometric morphism of triposes, where Φ+ is a morphism of Heyting prealgebras
componentwise, and there exists a further right adjoint Φ+ a Φ!, then Φ+ is a first-order
logical morphism.
Definition 3.20. An higher-order logical morphism of triposes (F, Φ) : P→ Q is a first-
order logical morphism which preserves weak power objects, i.e. for every Y : C:
πQ(FY) ∼= FπP(Y), ∈QFY ' ΦY×π(Y)(∈
P
Y).
The major example of logical morphisms of triposes are given by interpretation,
in the spirit of Lawvere’s functorial semantics. In fact, recalling Definition 3.5 and
Theorem 3.8, one readily realizes an interpretation J− K for a higher-order intuitionistic
theory T in the tripos P coincides with the datum of a higher-order logical morphism
J− K : LTT → P.
This point of view is quite powerful. For example, we immediately see P ∼= LTL[P],
where L[P] is the internal language of P equipped with higher-order intuitionistic logic
(its internal theory): the isomorphism is witnessed by the canonical interpretation of
L[P] in P.
From the logical point of view, we see every higher-order intuitionistic theory T has a
canonical interpretation 1LTT in itself, which can be identified with what it’s traditionally
called generic or term model. Moreover, we can now move interpretations along logical
morphisms simply by composition:
Lemma 3.21 (First-order Translation Lemma). Let (F, Φ) : P→ Q be a first-order logical
morphism between triposes. Suppose J− K is an interpretation of a first-order language L in P,
and let ϕ [~x :~Γ] be an L-formula. Then there exists an interpretation J− K′ of L in Q such that:
P J− K ϕ [~x :~Γ] implies Q J− K′ ϕ [~x :~Γ].
Proof. Let J− K′ simply be (F, Φ) ◦ J− K.
Corollary 3.21.1 (Higher-order Translation Lemma). Let P and Q be C-triposes, and let
Φ : P→ Q be a higher-order logical morphism between them. Suppose J− K is an interpretation
of a higher-order language L in P, and let ϕ [~x : ~Γ] be an L-formula. Then there exists an
interpretation J− K′ of L in Q such that:
P J− K ϕ [~x :~Γ] implies Q J− K′ ϕ [~x :~Γ].
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There is also a logical notion of morphisms between topoi:
Definition 3.22. A logical morphism of topoi Φ : E → F is a left exact functor such
that Φ(PX) ∼= P(ΦX) for each X :E , where P(−) denotes the power object operation.
Remark 3.22.1. Since a logical morphism is a left exact functor, Φ(∈EX) ∼= ∈FΦ(X) for every
X : E [Moerdijk and MacLane 1992, pp. 170–171]. In all respects, this means a logical
morphism is a functor preserving the higher-order logical structure of topoi.
Remark 3.22.2. Contrary to the definitions of geometric morphisms for triposes and topoi,
the definitions of (higher-order) logical morphism of triposes and topoi differ greatly in
the requests. In fact, a(n higher-order) logical morphism of triposes, in addition to being
‘left exact’ and preserving power objects, needs to preserve all the Heyting structure
plus the quantifiers, while a logical morphism of topoi doesn’t have this requirement
(or better, it is a consequence of the others). We strongly believe this state of affairs to
be a mirage which would be dissolved by a more thorough investigation. In particular,
we suspect the same ideas used to prove the second part of Theorem 3.18 might be
repurposed to this aim.
As anticipated, here the two guiding principles behind the definition of morphisms
of triposes meet: logical morphisms of triposes correspond to logical morphisms of
topoi.
Theorem 3.23. Every higher-order logical morphism Φ : P→ Q of triposes induces a logical
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To see this is well-posed, we can apply the Higher-Order Translation Lemma to the
canonical interpretation of L[P] in P, to get a semantics in Q. This allows us to claim Φ◦
sends PERs to PERs, functional relations to functional relations, identities to identities,
composites to composites, and finite limits to finite limits. Moreover, it commutes with
constant objects since:
Φ◦(X,=) = (X, Φ(∃P∆X (>PX))) = (X, ∃
Q
∆X
(>QX)) = (X,=) : C[Q].
It remains to check power objects are preserved. The power object of (X,∼) in C[P]
is given by (cf. (3.3.6) and (3.3.7))
(πP(1),⇔)(X,∼X) = (πP(X),∼), ∈C[P]X := ev(πP(1),⇔)(X,∼X ) .
Now, since πP(X) = πQ(X) by hypothesis and Φ(∼) and Φ(ev(πP(1),⇔)(X,∼)) continue
to satisfy their defining properties in C[Q] by virtue of the same Translation Lemma, the
theorem stands proved.
3.5 Semantics in a Pitts’ topos
Every elementary topos E has an internal higher-order language with equality L[E ],
sound with respect to higher-order intuitionistic logic, which is embodied by its tripos
of subobjects SubE . Hence L[E ] = L[SubE ], and the same goes for semantics:
Definition 3.24. Let L be a higher-order language. An interpretation J− K of L in a
topos E is an interpretation of L in the tripos SubE .
Thus, given an interpretation of L in E , a formula ϕ [~x :~Γ] is valid in E precisely
when it is valid in its tripos of subobjects:
E J− K ϕ [~x :~Γ] iff SubE J− K ϕ [~x :~Γ] iff ∀!J ϕ [~x :~Γ] K ' 11.
Remark 3.24.1. The notion of validity we just described is also known as Kripke–Joyal
semantics [Moerdijk and MacLane 1992, Section VI.6]. In particular, when L = L[E ],
the canonical interpretation in E is denoted by {−}, to evoke the set-theoretic notation
used for comprehension. Indeed the interpretation of a formula ϕ [~x :~Γ] amounts to the
maximal subobject of~Γ on which it holds:
{ϕ [~x :~Γ]} ~Γ.
Moreover, this subobject is classified by the morphism~Γ→ Ω given by the interpreta-
tion of
{~x :~Γ | ϕ} :~Γ→ Prop [~x :~Γ].
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Remark 3.24.2. If U a→ Γ is a generalized element of Γ, one can show that




or, equivalently, if χ{ϕ [~x:~Γ]}a factors through true : 1 ΩE .
3.5.1 Relation between P and SubC[P]
From a tripos P therefore, two languages arise:
L[P], L[C[P]].
In the following, we are to establish a connection between these two languages and their
semantics.
Theorem 3.25. Every C-tripos P admits a higher-order logical equivalence into SubC[P]∇P.
Proof. Let Q be SubC[P]∇P. Since Q is a C-tripos too, the first component of the log-
ical morphism (F, Φ) we are to build is just the identity on C. Hence we’ll loosely
refer to (F, Φ) as just Φ. Also, in the proof we’ll make abundant use of the canonical
interpretation J− K of L[P].
Remember every subobject of ∇P(X) is given by a P-predicate ϕ ∈ PX (it follows
from Lemma 3.10 and the fact every ϕ ∈ PX is =-strict). Therefore we can define
ΦX : PX −→ QX
ϕ 7−→ (X,=ϕ) (X,=)
where = denotes external equality, and =ϕ is defined as in (3.3.4). It’s easy to see
that this is a well-defined bijective correspondence with respect to both equivalence on
PX and on QX. Moreover, although tedious to check, these maps are preserve all the
structure of Heyting prealgebras. Naturality with respect to a C-morphism f : X → Y is
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If ϕ ∈ PY, we can chase it around the square to get that Φ is natural if and only if
(X,=P f (ϕ)) (X,=) is the pullback of (Y,=ϕ) (Y,=) along ∇P( f ),
where we recall ∇P( f ) = P( f × 1Y)(=). But if (X,∼pb) is such a pullback, then we
have
J x ∼pb x′ K ' J x = x′ ∧ ∃y ( f (x) = y ∧ ϕ(y)) K
' J x = x′ ∧ ϕ( f (x)) K
' J x =P f (ϕ) x′ K.
Here we used the construction of inverse images in C[P], which can be found in [Van
Oosten 2008, p. 67].
We now turn to the proof of the ‘logicality’ of Φ. To show it commutes with quanti-
fiers, we use the stronger property of having both adjoints, and this is true since Φ, we
claim, is actually part of an adjoint equivalence. Hence we guess
Φ!X((Y,∼) (X,=)) := Φ+X ((Y,∼) (X,=)) := J x ∼ x K
This would hold if
1Q ' ΦΦ+, Φ+Φ ' 1P
In fact, if (Y,∼) (X,=) ∈ QX and ψ ∈ PX, this would mean
(Y,∼) (X,=) ' (X,=Φ+X ((Y,∼)(X,=))) (X,=), Φ
+
X ((X,=ψ) (X,=)) ' ψ
and this follows from the definition of Φ and Φ+.
In conclusion, it remains to show weak power objects are preserved, meaning
πP(Y) = πQ(Y), ∈QY = ΦY×πP(Y)(∈
P
Y).
First of all, we recall from Example 3.4 that, for a tripos of subobjects, weak power
objects are given by certain exponentials and evaluation maps. In our case however, we
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Therefore, in order to prove our claim, it suffices to show (πP(Y),=) satisfies the














Thus let (Z,∼Z) : C[P] and (Y× Z,∼Y×Z)
F→ (πP(1),⇔). We want to show there exists
a unique arrow λF : (Z,∼Z)→ (πP(Y),=) such that the following commutes:





To this aim, we define
λF := J ∀y :Y ∀τ : πP(1) (ev′(〈y, σ〉, τ)↔ F(〈y, z〉, τ)) [z : Z, σ : πP(Y)] K.
One can check λF is a functional relation, by exploiting the fact ev′ and F are. More
interestingly, λF satisfies the required factorization property (the following formulae
are all in context [〈y, z〉 :Y× Z, τ : πP(1)], which we omitted for better readability):
ev′ ◦(1(Y,=) × λF) =
= J ∃〈y′, σ〉 :Y× πP(Y) ((1(Y,=) × λF)(〈y, z〉, 〈y′, σ〉) ∧ ev′(〈y′, σ〉, τ)) K
= J ∃σ : πP(Y) (λF(z, σ) ∧ ev′(〈y, σ〉, τ)) K
= J ∃σ : πP(Y) (∀y′ :Y ∀τ′ : πP(1) (ev′(〈y′, σ〉, τ′)↔ F(〈y′, z〉, τ′)) ∧ ev′(〈y, σ〉, τ)) K
= J ∃σ : πP(Y) (F(〈y, z〉, τ)) K
= F.
Finally, suppose λ′F has the same factorization property of λF. We want to show λ′F
is equivalent to λF, which amounts to proving (notice we only need one direction of
implication, thanks to λ′F and λF being functional relations):
P |= λ′F(z, σ)→ ∀y :Y ∀τ : πP(1) (ev′(〈y, σ〉, τ)↔ F(〈y, z〉, τ)) [z : Z, σ : πP(Y)].
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Informally, one can derive the double implication on the right as follows: from λ′F(z, σ)
and ev′(〈y, z〉, τ), we get ∃σ : πP(Y) (λF(z, σ) ∧ ev′(〈y, σ〉, τ)), which gives F(〈y, z〉, τ)
by hypothesis on λ′F. In the other direction, F(〈y, z〉, τ) implies ∃σ′ : πP(Y) (λF(z, σ′) ∧
ev′(〈y, σ′〉, τ)), but since we have λ′F(z, σ) and λ′F is functional, it must be σ = σ′, from
which we derive ev′(〈y, σ〉, τ) as desired.
Corollary 3.25.1. Suppose J− K is an interpretation of a higher-order language L in P, and let
ϕ [~x :~Γ] be an L-formula. Then there exists an interpretation J− K′ of L in SubC[P]∇P such
that:
P J− K ϕ [~x :~Γ] iff SubC[P]∇P J− K′ ϕ [~x :~Γ].
Proof. This is the content of Corollary 3.21.1.
Corollary 3.25.2. Let ϕ [~x :~Γ] be a well-formed formula in the language of P, let J− K be the
canonical interpretation of L[P] in P. Then ϕ [~x :~Γ] is well-formed in the language of C[P] (once
we agree not to distinguish a type X : C from its representation ∇P(X) : C[P]), the induced
interpretation J− K′ coincides with C[P]’s canonical one {−} for these formulae, and
P J− K ϕ [~x :~Γ] iff C[P] {−} ϕ [~x :~Γ].
Proof. That formulae of L[P] are also valid L[C[P]] formulae is straightforward. To say
J− K′ coincides with {−}whenever both are defined is simply to ascertain the following









So far, we considered only the restriction of tripos SubC[P] to the subcategory of
constant objects. Indeed, to seek a semantics from the full tripos SubC[P] to P is hopeless:
C[P] has just many more types and terms than C. Nonetheless, C[P] was built of of
P-predicates, thus we can always express formulae in C[P] using the language and logic
of P (see [Van Oosten 2008, Section 2.3]).
For given a L[C[P]]-formula ϕ [x : (X,∼X)], consider its Kripke–Joyal interpretation,
which realizes it as a subobject
{ϕ [x : (X,∼X)]} : (Y,∼Y) (X,∼X).
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Suppose, without loss of generality, {ϕ [x : (X,∼X)]} arises from a strict relation on
(X,∼X), which by abuse of notation we denote with the same name. Then that is the
expression of ϕ [x : (X,∼X)] in terms of P (recall Lemma 3.10):
R{ϕ [x:(X,∼X)]} := ∃
P
πX
{ϕ [x : (X,∼X)]} ∈ PX (3.5.3)
If ψ [x : X] is an L[P]-formula such that
R{ϕ [x:(X,∼X)]} ' J ψ [x : X] K, (3.5.4)
then we’ll write
ϕ [x : (X,∼X)] ψ [x : X]. (3.5.5)
To find such explicit syntactic representations, we now unfold (3.5.3) in various
specific situations. In order to better understand the following, remember how we built
C[P] (cf. Definition 3.9), in particular have in mind (3.3.2) where we listed the axioms
picking out morphisms (X,∼X)
F→ (Y,∼Y) from predicates in P(X×Y).
To start, one easily finds
true [x : (X,∼X)] x ∼X x [x : X], false [x : (X,∼X)] false [x : X]. (3.5.6)
Then to translate formulae obtained as S(t1, . . . , tn) for a relation symbol10 S of signature
(~Z, ~∼Z), applied to terms (hence C[P]-arrows)~t : (~Z, ~∼Z) [x : (X,∼X)], one first recalls
{S} is a subobject of (∏ni=1 Zi,∼∏ni=1 Zi ) which we can identify with the strict P-predicate
by which it’s represented. Then





Zi (t1(x, z1) ∧ · · · ∧ tn(x, zn) ∧ {S}(z)) [x : X].
(3.5.7)
Disjunctions and conjunctions pass as-is:
ψ ∧ η [x : (X,∼X)] R{ψ [x:(X,∼X)]} ∧ R{η [x:(X,∼X)]} [x : X],
ψ ∨ η [x : (X,∼X)] R{ψ [x:(X,∼X)]} ∨ R{η [x:(X,∼X)]} [x : X].
(3.5.8)
Implication becomes
ψ→ η [x : (X,∼X)] x ∼X x ∧ R{ψ [x:(X,∼X)]} → R{η [x:(X,∼X)]} [x : X]. (3.5.9)
10The only relation symbols in L[SubC[P]] are membership relations, which are translatable to L[P].
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Finally, quantifiers become
∃z : (Z,∼Z)ψ(x, z) [x : (X,∼X)]
 ∃z : Z R{ψ [z:(Z,∼Z), x:(X,∼X)]}(z, x) [x : X],
∀z : (Z,∼Z)ψ(x, z) [x : (X,∼X)]





In his article [Scott 1967], Scott explains a different point of view on Cohen’s proof of
independence of the continuum hypothesis. Following a discovery of Solovay, he notes
Cohen’s proof amounts to the construction of a ‘Boolean valued’ model of set theory.
The logic of such models is exactly that of Set[B(−)] for the chosen complete Boolean
algebra B. In particular, Scott employs a Boolean algebra obtained from the σ-field of a
probability space.
For the rest of the chapter, fix an arbitrary probability space Ω = (Ω,F , P).
4.1 Essential algebras
Consider, on the σ-field F , the order relation given by essential inclusion:
A ≤ B iff A \ B ∈ ker P.
We call (F ,≤) the essential prealgebra of Ω. Clearly, it inherits all the Boolean opera-
tions of F , plus the countable joins. It is therefore a σ-Boolean prealgebra.
Define now F/ ker P to be the posetal reflection of (F ,≤), i.e. the set of measurable
subsets of Ω considered up to essential1 equivalence:
A ' B iff A ≤ B and B ≤ A iff A∆B ∈ ker P.
We are to show F/ ker P is a complete Boolean algebra, which we’ll call the essential
algebra of Ω. When P is unambiguously clear from the context, we denote F/ ker P as
F.
1A proposition about measurable sets holds essentially if it holds up to a zero-measure modification of the
sets under consideration, i.e. up to change of representatives in their essential equivalence classes.
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Remark 4.0.1. One might notice the essential algebra F is complete if and only if the
essential prealgebra (F ,≤) is complete, thus one might as well stick with the first
instead of quotienting out (potentially precious) information by passing to the latter.
What we’d lose in doing so, though, is the strictness of all definitions involving meets
and joins, since these, in a prealgebra, are defined by universal properties. Hence
they do not uniquely define an element of the prealgebra, but only pinpoint its posetal
equivalence class.
Definition 4.1. A subset A of a lattice (L,≤) is an antichain if ⊥ 6∈ A and a ∧ b = ⊥
for every pair of distinct a, b ∈ A. L satisfies the countable chain condition (CCC) if
any antichain in L is at most countable.
Lemma 4.2 (Bell 2005, p. 150). A σ-algebra satisfying the CCC is complete.
Proof. Let (B,≤) be such a Boolean algebra. Suppose {xi}i∈I is a family of elements
indexed by an arbitrary set I. Denote by M the ideal generated by this family, that is,
the set of elements of B covered by a finite join of elements of the family:





M, if they exist.
Consider now the family A of subsets of M which are antichains. The family is
partially ordered by inclusion, and if U is a non-empty totally ordered subset of A, then
U :=
⋃U is an upper bound for U . Therefore Zorn’s lemma implies the existence of
a maximal antichain F contained in M. By the CCC on B, observe that F is at most
countable, and therefore admits a supremum
∨
F.




F. Since F ⊆ M, ∨ F ≤ ∨M trivally. Thus, we’ll
prove that if p is not an upper bound for M then it isn’t an upper bound for F either.
In fact, under this hypothesis, there exists an m ∈ M such that m 6≤ p, which implies
m ∧ ¬p 6= ⊥. Obviously, m ∧ ¬p ∈ M (because M is an ideal and m ∈ M). Then either
m ∧ ¬p ∈ F, and since m ∧ ¬p 6≤ p, p is not an upper bound of F; or m ∧ ¬p 6∈ F, and
by maximality of F there exists q ∈ F such that q ∧m ∧ ¬p 6= ⊥, from which it follows
that q ∧m ∧ ¬p 6≤ p, so that p is not an upper bound of F.
Lemma 4.3. The essential algebra of a probability space satisfies the CCC.
Proof. Let A be an antichain of F. This means A is a family of essentially non-empty,
essentially pairwise disjoint sets. Define
An := {[E] ∈ A |P(E) > 1/n}
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Since P is unitary, An has at most n elements. Thus A =
⋃
n∈NAn is at most countable.
It follows that:
Theorem 4.4. The essential algebra of a probability space is complete.
We can thus define the central object of this chapter:
Definition 4.5. Given a probability space Ω = (Ω,F , P), its associated Scott tripos is
the Set-tripos F(−). We denote its Pitts’ topos (Definition 3.9) by
Scott[Ω] := Set[F(−)]
and we call it the Scott topos associated to the probability space Ω.
Is every complete Boolean algebras the essential algebra of some probability space?
Any complete Boolean algebra B can be obtained by quotienting a σ-field by one of its
σ-ideals. In particular, from B we can construct its Stone space and equip it with the
σ-field of its clopen sets [Scott 1967]. Dividing this by the ideal of its meager sets yields
an algebra isomorphic to B. This seems to settle the question.
On the other hand, we defined essential algebras starting with spaces equipped with
a probability measure, not just a σ-ideal. Hence one may ask: can we endow every
measurable space with a distinguished σ-ideal with a probability measure whose
σ-ideal of null sets coincides with the one given? This does not seem to be the case.
For example, let X be an infinite set considered with its discrete σ-field P (X).
Suppose we fixed {∅} as σ-ideal and now we want to find a probability measure P on
P (X) such that ker P = {∅}. In that case, P({x}) > 0 for each x ∈ X, and a theorem
of Ulam [Jech 2006, Theorem 10.1] says that if P is such a measure, then either
1. X has cardinality greater or equal to that of the least inaccessible cardinal
or
2. the reals have cardinality greater or equal to that of the least weakly inaccessible
cardinal.
In both case, we would have proven the existence of a weakly inaccessible cardinal,
which is not possible in ZFC (at least, if it is consistent). Hence such a measure cannot
be proven to exist in our chosen metatheory.
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4.2 A bird-eye view of the construction
In the preceding paragraphs, we gave a construction starting from a probability space
and yielding a topos, passing through a tripos. We now ponder on the functoriality of
such constructions, and highlight some connections with the ideas in [Adachi and Ryu
2016] and [Jackson 2006].
The first remark we make is about the relationship between the category Prob0 (the
category of probability spaces and null-preserving measurable maps, see Definition 2.13)
and our construction. It is now clear that such a morphism has a compelling logical
interpretation, since a null-preserving measurable map (X, ΣX , PX)
f→ (Y, ΣY, PY) has
all it’s needed to induce a well-defined map between the essential algebras of X and Y:
f−1 : ΣY/ ker PY −→ ΣX/ ker PX .
Therefore, the category Prob0 can be thought as a category of probability spaces and
‘logically relevant’ morphisms between them, corroborating further the idea that such
morphisms ‘preserve knowledge’ or ‘information’.
Our construction recalls another instance (actually the instance) of such ‘space-to-
topos’ construction, namely the construction of a topos of sheaves on a topological space.
Similarly to our case, the construction begins by shifting the focus from the space X to
its frame of open sets O(X). In doing this, continuous maps X → Y become maps of
frames O(Y) → O(X) in the opposite direction. Hence if we want to replace X with
O(X) (i.e. if we want to do topology ‘without points’), we need to reverse maps again:
topological spaces Top X
f−→ Y
frames Frm O(X) f
−1
←− O(Y)
locales Loc := Frmop O(X) f−→ O(Y)
topoi Topos Sh X
f ∗a f∗−→ Sh Y
The category Prob0 is a natural candidate for the domain of a functor Scott[−]
taking a probability space Ω to its Scott topos Scott[Ω]. However, this functor should
factorize through various other functors, describing the steps of the construction. The
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first of these should be Ess:
Probop0 CBool
(X, ΣX , PX) ΣX/ ker PX




The category CBool is the category of complete Boolean algebras and maps between







where the adjoint pair of natural transformations f+ a f+ is induced by the Adjoint
Functor Theorem for posets (Theorem 1.7):
( f+)X : AX −→ BX
α 7−→ f ◦ α.
( f+)X : BX −→ AX
β 7−→
∨
{α ∈ AX | f ◦ α ≤ β}.
(4.2.3)
Clearly f+ preserves meets since f is a map of CBool, although this can be strengthened
further by observing it has a further left adjoint, namely
( f !)X : BX −→ AX
β 7−→
∧
{α ∈ AX | β ≤ f ◦ α}.
(4.2.4)
By Remark 3.19.1, f+ is a a first-order logical morphism of triposes (although not
higher-order, since it doesn’t preserve weak power objects in general).





f+a f+ f ∗a f∗
(4.2.5)
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where a geometric morphism of Set-triposes induces a geometric morphism of topoi by
the construction of Theorem 3.18 (whose functoriality is trivial).
All in all, we arrived at the following factorization:
Prob0 CBoolop TriposSet Topos
Scott[−]
Essop (=)(−) Set[−] (4.2.6)
Getting back to the analogy with topological spaces and their topoi of sheaves, we
can represent the abstraction hierarchy of Scott’s construction in the same vein:
probability spaces Prob0 Ω
f−→ Ω′
complete Boolean algebras CBool Ess Ω
f−1←− Ess Ω′
triposes TriposSet Ess Ω
(−) f
+a f+−→ Ess Ω′(−)
topoi Topos Scott[Ω]
f ∗a f∗−→ Scott[Ω′]
The sheaf-theoretic side. In [Jackson 2006], Jackson shows there is a topology on the
topos PshF whose sheaves form the topos Sh(F/ ker P). This topos is equivalent to
the Scott topos of Ω, by Theorem 3.13. In his work, Jackson formulates a ‘sheaf-theoretic’
version of measure theory, by generalizing many constructions and theorems to arbitrary
locale and then expressing them in terms of sheaf theory.
Our work, although related and inspired by Jackson’s, is going to differ since our
goal is not to recast notions from stochastic calculus in tripos-theoretic language, but to
relativize them in the peculiar setting of Scott topoi.
We also mention Wendt’s [Wendt 1996], in which the topos Sh(F/ ker P) is con-
sidered and some of its basic properties are analyzed. Wendt is trying to develop
categorical tools to talk about fibrations in a measure-theoretic setting, in particular
regarding Hilbert spaces.
4.3 Some facts about Scott topoi
We now outline some of the topos-theoretic and logical properties of Scott topoi. To avoid
confusion between the probability space Ω = (Ω,F , P) and the subobject classifier
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ΩScott[Ω] of Scott[Ω], we denote the latter by Σ, and its equality relation by⇔ (see proof
of Theorem 3.11).
1. The localic reflection of Scott[Ω] is F, i.e.
Sub 1 = F = F/ ker P.
This is a general fact about localic topoi [Moerdijk and MacLane 1992, p. 490].
2. We punctualize Σ is not isomorphic to ∇F in general. This because⇔ is a truly
different equality predicate in most of the cases.
3. It’s Boolean, meaning for every proposition ϕ in the language of Scott[Ω],
Scott[Ω] |= ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
This is equivalent to the following, maybe surprising fact:
1 + 1 ∼= Σ.
The isomorphism is given by
F : {0, 1} ×F −→ F
(1, A) 7−→ A
(0, A) 7−→ ¬A
This means that, from the internal point of view, Scott[Ω] has only two logical
values, i.e.
Scott[Ω] |= ∃x : Σ ∃y : Σ ∀z : Σ (z⇔ x ∨ z⇔ y).
In fact















4. It’s not two-valued in general, meaning Σ has more than two global elements. In
fact, for any A ∈ F, the following is a global element:
pAq : 1× Σ −→ F
B 7−→ A⇔ B
(4.3.1)
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Since any well-pointed topos (i.e. non-degenerate and generated by 1) is two-
valued, this also shows Scott[Ω] isn’t well-pointed.
5. It satisfies the axiom of choice, in both the external and internal sense. The
external axiom of choice (eAC) is satisfied by a topos E iff every surjective map
X Y admits a section, while the internal axiom of choice (iAC) is satisfied iff,
for every object X and Y:
E |= ∀ f ∈ YX ((∀y ∈ Y ∃x ∈ X f (x) = y)→ (∃g ∈ XY ∀y ∈ Y f (g(y)) = y)).
This is again the statement that every surjective map admits a section, although
in the logic of E . It’s easy to see eAC entails iAC, while the opposite isn’t true,
since the internal logic of a topos can be weaker than the external one.
Then Scott[Ω] satisfies both versions of AC since it is Boolean and localic over Set,
and these properties characterize topoi satisfying eAC [Johnstone 2002, Theorem
D4.5.15].
4.4 Real numbers in a Scott topos
In a way, the Scott tripos of a probability space encodes the logic naturally attached to it.
Therefore, the Scott topos is the natural environment to do mathematics dependent on
such a stochastic context.
A confirmation of this is given by the mathematical practice of treating Ω as an
underlying unknown space whose only real purpose is to imbue random variables
with randomness. Moreover, such random variables are informally treated as numbers,
except they behave in an unusual way. That’s usually where the analogy breaks down
and mathematicians stop to pretend, resorting to probability and measure theory to
properly handle such objects. However, the discrepancy between random variables and
real numbers dissolves if we work inside the Scott topos of Ω.
4.4.1 Number systems in a topos
Since a topos has a rich internal language, one can carry out the usual definitions of Z,
Q and R. The only missing ingredient is N, which must be defined extrinsically.
Definition 4.6. A natural numbers object (NNO for short) in a topos E is an object
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satisfying the following universal property: for every other X :E which comes equipped
with maps 1 z→ X s→ X, there is a unique morphism NE











Remark 4.6.1. This definition is actually an induction schema in disguise. In fact, ϕ is
exactly the function such that
ϕ(0) = z, ϕ(succ n) = s(ϕ(n)) for all n :NE .
Remark 4.6.2. Not every (elementary) topos has a natural numbers object, for instance,
FinSet does not have one. Anyway, all Grothendieck topoi, such as Scott[Ω], have a




As anticipated, one might start from N to build an internal version of Z, Q and R.
For Z and Q, one simply carries out the same construction. For example, the integer
numbers object Z can be defined as the quotient of N 2 under the relation
{n + n′ = m + m′ [n, n′, m, m′ :N ]} ↪→ N 2 ×N 2.
Since topoi admit quotients, this is a perfectly good definition for Z . Q is then defined
as the field of fractions of Z .
Real numbers are subtler though, since there a bunch of constructions for them
which are equivalent only under some assumptions. The two most important ones are
Dedekind’s and Cantor’s constructions.
Dedekind defined the real numbers to be cuts in the rational numbers, i.e. pairs (L, R)
of subsets of Q which should correspond to the set of rationals to the left and to the
right of the definiendum. This is suitably axiomatized by requirements on the sets L
and R. This construction ofR is outlined in [Moerdijk and MacLane 1992, Section VI.8],
and yields an object which is aptly named the Dedekind real numbers object.
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Cantor instead defines the real numbers as equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences
of rational numbers, under the equivalence which identifies sequences ‘converging to
the same point’. This version of R is the Cauchy real numbers object. To prove this
construction is equivalent to the other one, one needs a choice principle. Hence, in a
general topos, Cauchy real numbers are not the same as Dedekind real numbers.
However, in our case this is not a problem since we’ve seen Scott[Ω] is Boolean
and satisfies the axiom of choice. Hence we will not distinguish between Dedekind or
Cauchy real numbers, and we will simply refer to them as ‘real numbers’.
4.4.2 Number systems in Scott topoi
Fix a probability space (Ω,F , P).
Theorem 4.7. The topos Scott[Ω] has a natural numbers object NΩ given by
NΩ = ∇(N).
Proof. See [Wendt 1996, Section 4].
Recall∇ : Set→ Scott[Ω] is the functor of constant objects, which takes a set X and
endows it with an internalization = of external equality for which:
J n = m K =
Ω if n = m∅ else.
Theorem 4.8. The topos Scott[Ω] has a (Dedekind) real numbers objectRΩ given by
RΩ := ∇F(−)(R) = (R, =)
Proof. See [Wendt 1996, Section 4], where it is also proved these are isomorphic to
Cauchy real numbers.
Proposition 4.9. Equip R with its Borel σ-field. Then the object
R′Ω := (Msbl(Ω, R), {− = −}), (4.4.3)
is isomorphic toRΩ; where {X = Y} denotes the (equivalence class of the) measurable subset of
Ω on which X and Y coincide.
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Proof. One can easily show the following is a well-defined arrow which is an isomor-
phism fromR′Ω toRΩ in Scott[Ω]:
F : Msbl(Ω, R)×R −→ F
(X, x) 7−→ {X = x}
(4.4.4)
In fact, recalling the identity of an object is given by its very equality predicate, we
check:
F ◦ F−1 = J ∃X : Msbl(Ω, R) (F−1(x, X) ∧ F(X, y)) [x, y :RΩ] K
= (x, y) 7→
∨
Ω X→R
{X = x ∧ X = y}
= (x, y) 7→ {x = y}
= 1RΩ
F−1 ◦ F = J ∃x :RΩ (F(X, x) ∧ F−1(x, Y)) [X, Y : Msbl(Ω, R)] K
= (X, Y) 7→
∨
x∈R
{X = x} ∧Y = x}
= (X, Y) 7→ {X = Y}
= 1(Msbl(Ω, R), {−=−}).
Remark 4.9.1. Notice {X = Y} = Ω if and only if X and Y are almost-everywhere equal.
Remark 4.9.2. One can also easily check that the arithmetic operations induced onRmΩ by
the isomorphism withRΩ are determined by the relative componentwise operations.
Remark 4.9.3. The previous proof actually works for any algebra of measurable functions
over Ω containing all the constants and equipped with almost-everywhere equality. In
particular, all the Lp spaces become isomorphic toR.
We conclude with an application.
Definition 4.10. A sequence of random variables {Xn : Ω→ R}n∈N converges almost
surely to the random variable X : Ω→ R if it converges pointwise almost everywhere:
Xn −→n X a.e.
We can think of a sequence of random variables {Xn}n∈N it as the function
X : ∇N×R −→ F
(n, Y) 7−→ {Xn = Y}
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which defines an element of RmΩ
NΩ which entirely belongs to it. Moreover, X is an
element of RmΩ which belongs totally to it. After we have noticed these facts, the
statement of the following theorem becomes clear.
Theorem 4.11. A sequence of random variables on Ω is almost-surely convergent if and only if
it is a convergent sequence of real numbers in Scott[Ω].
Proof. Let {Xn}n∈N be a sequence of random variables over Ω that converges pointwise
to the random variable X. We have to show:
Scott[Ω] |= ∃n :NΩ ∀n′ :NΩ (n′ > n→ |Xn′ − X| < 1/m) [m :NΩ]. (4.4.5)
We denote with J− K the canonical interpretation of predicates in the Scott tripos of Ω.





J n′ ≤ n K∨ J |Xn′ − X| < 1/m K
)
' Ω







{ω ∈ Ω| n′ ≤ n} ∪ {ω ∈ Ω| |Xn′(ω)− X(ω)| < 1/m}
))
= 1. (4.4.6)
If Xn converges to X almost surely, then there exists n such that for every n′ ≥ n,
P({ω ∈ Ω| |Xn′(ω)− X(ω)| < 1/m}) = 1.
In particular, (4.4.6) holds.












{ω ∈ Ω| ∃n ∈N ∀n′ ∈N(n′ > n→ |Xn′(ω)− X(ω)| < 1/m))}
)
= 1
If we consider the intersection of all the sets
{ω ∈ Ω| ∃n ∈N ∀n′ ∈N(n′ > n→ |Xn′(ω)− X(ω)| < 1/m)}
as m ranges in N, we get a set of probability 1 which is the set
{ω ∈ Ω| ∀m ∈N ∃n ∈N ∀n′ ∈N(n′ > n→ |Xn′(ω)− X(ω)| < 1/m)}.
This means precisely that {Xn}n∈N converges almost surely to X.
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4.4.3 A possible internalization of stochastic processes
One may now try to understand whether we arrived to a point at which we can start
to internalize the theory of stochastic processes. Indeed, one way to see a (say, real-
valued) stochastic process is as a collection of random variables over Ω indexed by a
time monoid I. This can be packaged into a function I → Msbl(Ω, R). This suggests a
stochastic process is a map ∇I → RΩ in Scott[Ω], i.e. a real-valued function from the
internal point of view.
Theorem 4.12. Let {Xt : Ω→ R}t∈I be a stochastic process. Then it defines a map∇I → RΩ
in Scott[Ω], defined by
X : I ×Msbl(Ω, R) −→ F
(t, Y) 7−→ {Xt = Y}
(4.4.7)
Proof. We only have to show X is a well-defined map, hence verify conditions (3.3.2):
1. It is strict, since
X(t, Y) ≤ J t = t K∧ {Y = Y} = Ω.
2. It is relational, since
X(t, Y) ∧ J t = s K∧ {Y = Y′} = {Xt = Y} ∧ J t = s K∧ {Y = Y′}
≤ {Xs = Y′}
= X(s, Y′).
3. It is single valued, since
X(t, Y) ∧ X(t, Y′) = {Xt = Y} ∧ {Xt = Y′} ≤ {Y = Y′}.
4. It is total, since




Remark 4.12.1. An arrow X : ∇I → RΩ determines a stochastic process in the external
sense: one picks Xt to be the random variable Y : Ω→ R given by totality of X. In fact
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This means Ω can be covered by a family of events over which ‘X(t) = Y’, for Y possibly
changing for each event in the covering. This cover, by virtue of the CCC property
of F, can be refined to a countable antichain, i.e. an essential, countable partition of
Ω. Therefore we can patch together the definition of Xt over each of these pairwise
disjoint sets, and get a global definition2, as desired. Notice this process defines Xt in an
essentially unique way.
Example 4.13. A common requirement for a process is almost-everywhere (right, left,
or both) continuity, which means almost-all realizations of Xt are continuous.
Suppose then I = R+, so that ∇I = (R+,=) = R+, as shown before. Then
continuity trivially translates to the following requirement:
Scott[Ω] |= pX : I → R+ is a continuous mapq.
Remark 4.13.1. As much as ∇R is isomorphic to (Msbl(Ω, R), {− = −}), so ∇I is
isomorphic to (Msbl(Ω, I), {− = −}). Hence the function X can be defined not only
on deterministic times, but also on ‘random times’ τ : Ω→ I. One can compute these
values by precomposing X with the isomorphism (Msbl(Ω, I), {− = −}) G→ ∇I, which
is analogous to the one given for real numbers (4.4.4) (we abuse notation by calling X
both X as defined in (4.4.7) and its precomposition with G):




{τ = t ∧ Xt = Y}
Since Xt can be considered, as we observed above, the value of a function I
X→
Msbl(Ω, R) at time t ∈ I, there is no obstacle to consider the composite map Xτ :=
Ω τ→ I X→ Msbl(Ω, R). Therefore
J X(τ, Y) K = {Xτ = Y}.
This is an half-victory, however, since we have already observed ‘vanilla’ stochastic
processes are of little use. Adaptivity or stronger measurability properties are central to
stochastic calculus, and to the very notion of ‘time-dependent random process’ itself.
In the next chapter, we embark on an investigation on some elementary additions to
Scott[Ω] internal language which could allow to express measurability in an elementary
manner.
2This way of extracting a witness of existence is akin to an existence property [Moschovakis 2018, Section
4.2] or to a compactness property [Blechschmidt 2017, Chapter II.7].
Chapter 5
Time in Scott topoi
5.1 Filtration modalities
Let Ω = (Ω,F , {Ft}t∈I , P) be a filtered probability space. We assume I has a top
element ∞, so that F∞ := F .
A filtration, as noted back in Chapter 2, represents growing observable knowledge
about the world. An event A ∈ Ft is a certain observation one made before instant t.
Notice the bigger the event (inclusion-wise) the less information it contains. In fact,
ideally, the best possible observation would allow one to pinpoint a specific outcome
{ω} ∈ Ft. However, this is usually not possible, first of all because any realization at
time t is oblivious of the future. Hence a completely unambiguous observation can only
be made at t = ∞, when the experiment has ended. Until then, the best one can do is to
come up with a decreasing sequence of events which, as time goes on and we acquire
new information, narrows down on the final outcome:
A0 ⊇ · · · ⊇ At ⊇ · · · ⊇ A∞. (5.1.1)
On the other hand, the reverse problem is also interesting. Suppose the experiment has
ended, and we are handed out ‘final’ observations. These amounts to an event B at ∞.
Now, given a time t ∈ I, what does the information contained in B allow me to conclude
about the status of the experiment at time t?
This might sound trivial at first, since F∞ is omniscient about the outcomes of the
experiment, yet it’s not. If we identify events with the propositions on Ω which they
reify, then it is clear that knowing an arbitrary proposition about the final state of a
system (e.g. ‘three heads were tossed’) doesn’t allow me to completely know what has
73
74 CHAPTER 5. TIME IN SCOTT TOPOI
been going on in the past states (e.g. ‘how many heads were tossed after seven trials?’).
We’ll now see how the modalities introduced in Subsection 1.2.2 can be used to
formalize this phenomenon. Indeed, a filtration of σ-fields carries over to the essential
algebras associated to each of the Ft. We denote them in blackboard bold. Hence we
have a chain of inclusions:
F0 . . . Ft . . . F∞.
Remark 5.0.1. The essential algebra Ft is not Ft/ ker P, but Ft/(ker P ∩ Ft), unless
F• is a complete filtration. Since meager subsets of Ft are still meager at later times,
the inclusions are well-defined. Notice, however, that as time passes the equivalence
relation ' (essential equivalence) becomes strictly finer, i.e. if A ≤ B in Ft (from now on,
also denoted as A ≤t B) then A ≤ B at ∞, but the reverse is not always true. This has
the intuitive meaning that, as times passes, we can exclude more and more ‘possibilities’
and hence our knowledge of what is impossible increases (since once something is
known to be impossible, it remains such).
Let’s focus, for now, on the inclusions Ft ↪→ F∞. As observed in Subsection 1.2.2,
they give rise to a pair of adjoint modal operators on F∞:
♦t a t : F∞ → F∞. (5.1.2)
We can interpret them in the following way: if B ∈ F∞ is an event at ∞, then
♦tB =
∧
{A ∈ Ft | B ⊆ A}
= possible state of the experiment at time t, given B at time ∞;
tB =
∨
{A ∈ Ft | A ⊆ B}
= necessary state of the experiment at time t, given B at time ∞.
(5.1.3)
The words ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’ have to be understood in the following way. The
event tB contains every outcome which must have happened at time t for B to happen
later. Conversely, the event ♦tB contains every outcome which could have happened at
time t if B subsequently happened. Therefore outcomes in ♦tB may not have happened
later, but at time t they were not incompatible with the future realization of B; whereas
outcomes in tB all happened in the end, ending up in B.
Remark 5.0.2. By construction, notice an essential event t A or ♦t A can be considered
an essential event of Ft as well, since both modalities factor by the inclusion Ft ↪→ F∞.
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Example 5.1. Suppose in 2015 you sneaked up in a De Lorean car, retrofitted as a time
machine, and traveled back to the year 1955 to give to your past self a sports almanac
from the future you come from. In 1955, you now want to take advantage of your
knowledge by betting on the sports events registered in the almanac you received.
Unfortunately, a snarky kid (who, oddly enough, seems to come from 1985 himself),
spoils the almanac so that outcomes of specific games are not intelligible anymore. The
only information you have is in the cumulative statistics of each season. Hence:
B = information in the (spoilt) sports almanac,
1955 B = outcomes of 1955 and earlier games
you can infer from the statistics in the almanac,
♦1955 B = outcomes of 1955 and earlier games
you cannot exclude given the statistics in the almanac.
We can now read (5.1.1) in terms of the ♦modalities: if one makes the best possible
observations at each time t, the sequence of events narrowing down to the final event is
given by
♦0 A ≥ · · · ≥ ♦t A ≥ · · · ≥ ♦∞ A = A. (5.1.4)
The decreasing property of the sequence corresponds to the narrowing of the possibilities
as the time passes and allows us to prune those outcomes which didn’t realize.
Dually, the modality gives an increasing sequence of events representing growing
definitive knowledge of the final event:
0 A ≤ · · · ≤ t A ≤ · · · ≤ ∞ A = A. (5.1.5)
Notice the distinction with the previous case: if ♦ narrows on the final event by pruning
possibilities,  grows a conservative estimate on the final event by collecting definitive
evidence.
Identities. By elementary considerations on the definition of ♦ and , we see that for




where s ∧ t denotes the smallest between s and t (since I is a total order). Mixed
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This is just an instance of the obvious fact that both ♦t and t fix the events in Ft.
Moreover, by (1.2.5), we can also relate the other two composites:
¬s♦t = ♦st¬ (5.1.8)
regardless of the relationship between s, t ∈ I (of course if s ≥ t, this generalized duality
collapses to (1.2.5)).
5.2 In Scott topoi
Given a morphism of Boolean frames A
f→ B, what happens to their associated localic
topoi?
We look at this situation in the framework of forcing triposes. First of all, notice
f ! a f a f! induces a triplet of pseudonatural transformations:
f !X : B
X −→ AX
β 7−→ f ! ◦ β,
fX : AX −→ BX
α 7−→ f ◦ α,
f!X : B
X −→ AX
β 7−→ f! ◦ β.
(5.2.1)
The first, f a f!, has a left exact inverse part, therefore Theorem 3.18 gives us a





However, f ! is not left exact in general:
Example 5.2. Consider the morphism P (2)
f→ P (N) induced by the assignment
> 7→ {even numbers}, ⊥ 7→ {odd numbers}.
Then consider
B1 = {even numbers} ∪ {1}, B2 = {odd numbers} ∪ {0}.
Clearly, f !(B1 ∩ B2) = {0, 1}, but f !(B1) ∩ f !(B2) = P (N) ∩ P (N) = P (N).
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This means Set[B(−)]
f−→ Set[A(−)] is an essential geometric morphism, but in
general not an open one (i.e. f ! a f doesn’t lift to a geometric morphism Set[A(−)]→
Set[B(−)])
Nonetheless, one can bring both modalities to the internal language of Set[B(−)] by
defining them fiberwise, and introducing new rules in the language:
J f ϕ [~x :~Γ] K := 
J Γ K
f J ϕ [~x :~Γ] K,
J♦ f ϕ [~x :~Γ] K := ♦
J Γ K
f J ϕ [~x :~Γ] K
(5.2.3)
where J Γ Kf := fX f!X and ♦
J Γ K
f := fX f
!
X .
Proposition 5.3. A morphism of complete Boolean algebras A
f→ B induces two arrows
(B,⇔)→ (B,⇔) in the topos Set[B(−)], namely
 f : B×B −→ B
(b, b′) 7−→  f (b)⇔ b′
♦ f : B×B −→ B
(b, b′) 7−→ ♦ f (b)⇔ b′
(5.2.4)
Proof. By naturality of Xf and ♦
X
f (as transformations SubSet[B(−) ] → SubSet[B(−) ]) and
Yoneda Lemma.
Remark 5.3.1. Notice  f (and, analogously, ♦ f ) is surjective:∨
σ∈Σ
 f (τ)⇔ σ ≥ ( f (∅)⇔ σ) ∨ ( f (>B)⇔ σ) = ¬σ ∨ σ = >B.
This might seem weird at first, but it isn’t. Compare this to the following, ‘classical’ fact:
the map 2b−/2c : N→N is surjective. This doesn’t mean it is trivial. For example, one
can characterize even numbers as its fixed points.
The topos-theoretic approach to such adjoint pairs of modalities is described and
thoroughly investigated by Reyes in [Reyes et al. 1991] and by Reyes and Zolfaghari
in [Reyes and Zolfaghari 1991]. In these works, the authors recognize how certain
geometric morphisms of topos E Γ→ S give rise to an adjoint pair of modal operators
♦ a  (which they call MAO, as in ‘modal adjoint operators’) which is analogous to
ours.
They interpret the geometric morphism Γ to exhibit E as a topos of ‘variable sets’
over a topos of ‘constant sets’ S . The intuition behind their work is then to use the
‘variability’ of E to represent possible worlds, in the Kripkean sense.
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Call ∆ the inverse part of Γ. They induce an obvious pair of morphisms:
SubS (X) SubE (∆X).
∆X
ΓX
The first is defined by simply applying ∆ to any mono U  X, while the second is
defined on V  ∆X as the pullback of Γ(V) Γ∆(X) along the unit ηX : X → Γ∆(X)
(or, alternatively, as the image of the transpose map Γ(V)→ X).
To make ∆X well-defined, ∆ has to preserve all meets (this is ‘assumption (∗)’ in
[Reyes and Zolfaghari 1991]). As we observed, this is equivalent to have a left adjoint
ΠX to ∆X. In the end, ΠX a ∆X a ΓX is equivalent to the adjoint string f !X a fX a f!X
we found independently, as described by [Reyes and Zolfaghari 1991, Proposition 1.1].





Unfortunately, in our case this approach does not yield the desired modalities, since  f
and ♦ f are modalities on B, and thus should appear as operators on ΩE . We were not
able to ‘transpose’ Reyes’ formalism to yield a similar theory on E .
We find the reason for this in the different character of our modalities with respect to
the ones investigated by Reyes. While his are alethic modalities, questioning the validity
of a proposition in the accessible variations (pictured to be E , accessed through ∆ a Γ)
of a fixed world (picture to be S), our modalities question the available knowledge of a
process which already took place.
This is very clear when f is instantiated to be the inclusion Ft ↪→ F∞ which gives
rise to the modalities t a ♦t we outlined at the beginning of the chapter. Those modal
operators are used to speak about ‘accessed worlds’ and not ‘accessible worlds’, as the
events they produce have already happened.
5.2.1 Internal measurable criteria for stochastic processes
Return now to Scott topoi. If Ω is filtered by {Ft}t∈I , the above construction provides
us with a large arsenal of modalities for the internal language of Scott[Ω] = Set[F(−)∞ ].
Can we use them to express filtration-related properties of a process X? We’ve
seen in Theorem 4.12 that a process {Xt : Ω → R}t∈I gives a map X : ∇I → R in
1In the general case Π is only lax natural, so that π is lax too. In our case however, Π is natural and π is
strict. This is addressed by [Reyes and Zolfaghari 1991, Example 1].
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Scott[Ω], confirming the conceptual view that processes ought to be functions, in some
sense. What we couldn’t do was to impose measurability conditions on X, such as
adaptivity, which is the most important among the ones we saw back in Chapter 2.
The above question remains largely open, since we didn’t have the time to delve into
this issue thoroughly enough. Therefore, we collect here some ideas, comments and
open questions concerning this matter.
Adaptivity. Recall a process {Xt : Ω→ R}t∈I is adapted if each Xt is Ft-measurable;
hence if its value in the present doesn’t depend on future events. One could approach
the formalization of such condition using the modalities arising from {Ft}t∈I . In fact to
say Xt is Ft-measurable is equivalent to sayt and ♦t fix every event X−1t A, A ∈ B(R).
Since B(R) is generated by half-lines (−∞, a], we could as well express this condition as
{Xt ≤ a} ≤ t{Xt ≤ a}, for all a ∈ R.
Now this looks like something which could be internalized rather easily. In fact {Xt ≤ a}
is the truth value of the proposition X(t) ≤ a in Scott[Ω]. Nonetheless, the naïve attempt
may be a failure. Suppose we define (using Scott[Ω]’s language directly, not its tripos’)
the following internal adaptivity predicate:
∀t :∇I ∀a :RΩ (X(t) ≤ a→ t(X(t) ≤ a)) [X :R∇IΩ ]. (5.2.5)
This says X(t) ≤ a has to be a fixed point of t. We’ve seen in Remark 5.3.1 that even if
t is surjective, it need not to be trivial, and its fixed points are indeed not trivial: they
correspond to those essential events in Ft.
Question 1. Indeed, an interesting thing to observe is the data of a filtration {Ft}t∈I and of a
family of adjoint modalities {♦t a t}t∈I are somewhat equivalent. What is the exact extent
to which this is true?
The predicate (5.2.5) has two main defects we have to iron out. The first is that
RΩ includes also non-constant reals, as we’ve seen in the previous chapter. Hence the
measurability condition X(t) ≤ a might not be right. The second is we use t both as a
variable and as index for(−). Such indexes are ‘external’, while t is an internal symbol,
so the predicate written above is ill-formed. One may circumvent this by defining a map
like




((t(A)⇔ B)↔ `(A, B)).
(5.2.6)
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A second way is to define, externally, a family of predicates, indexed by I and by R
(thereby externalizing the two universal quantifications). Then one may express (5.2.5)
by taking the infimum of all of them. This, however, is less appetizing as it is not a
completely internal construction.
Question 2. Is (5.2.5) a good candidate for internalizing the concept of adaptivity?
Filtration modalities for stochastic processes. Another line of investigation is given
by the distinction between ♦t and t. Indeed, we wrote t in (5.2.5) where ♦t would
have been equally effective, since both have the same fixed points.
Question 3. Are there any concepts, in the theory of stochastic processes, that one can represent
with one but not the other? More generally, what is the significance of their meaning, as explored
at the beginning of this chapter, for stochastic calculus and non-deterministic dynamical systems
in general?





Process logic and stochastic
processes
We want now to explore the logical potential of the set of modalities associated to
a stochastic filtration that we introduce in Chapter 5. To do so, we first begin by
reviewing the principal logics developed to speak about ‘processes’ in ‘time’. These can
be distinguished in two kinds: temporal and dynamic logics.
Temporal logics are endogenous logics, which means they fix a specific ‘system’ and
reason about its behaviour only. In particular, their syntax does not allow one to write a
description of the system. Dynamic logic instead is exogenous, meaning one can speak
about the system itself in the language. Moreover one can describe their composition
and thus create new ones: complex systems are built out of ‘atomic ones’, which are
the only one whose semantics has to be explicitly given. Hopefully, this distinction will
become clearer as we describe both kinds of logic.
Remark A.0.1. We stress both CTL∗ and PDL, which are, respectively the temporal and
dynamic logics we are about to expound, are subsystems of the modal µ-calculus. This
system is remarkably simpler compared to those two, having two fixpoint operators
at its disposal. See [Venema 2008] for an elementary introduction to the µ-calculus,
through the lens of process logic, and [Emerson 1997] for a discussion of how CTL∗ and
PDL can be embedded in the modal µ-calculus.
Let us spend some words on the meaning of ‘process’, ‘time’, ‘system’, ‘state’ and
‘transition’. These are very intuitive words, inextricably related to each other, whose
meaning has many different hues.
83
84 APPENDIX A. PROCESS LOGIC AND STOCHASTIC PROCESSES
Ultimately, a ‘system’ can be anything capable of change. In our matters, systems
only have internal properties and exhibit a one-way external behaviour1. Then a ‘process’
is the unfolding of the changes a system undergoes throughout ‘time’. ‘Time’ is an
ordered collection of instants. At each instant of ‘time’, a ‘system’ can be in a variety of
‘states’. Thus the change of a ‘system’ can be broken up in ‘transitions’ from a ‘state’ to
another.
One may dispense with a ‘system’ altogether, and directly speak of ‘processes’,
adopting a behavioural approach instead. This is more of a philosophical choice than
a mathematical one, although such a choice makes a difference in ease of applica-
tion, depending on the context. The counterpart to ‘behavioural’ is ‘ontological’. The
‘behavioural’ versus ‘ontological’ attitudes are reflected in the ‘exogenous’ versus ‘en-
dogenous’ characteristics of dynamic and temporal logic, respectively2.
In our context, processes are certainly more central. Indeed, a filtration usually
encodes the unfolding of a process3 whose ‘generating system’ can be unknown. Never-
theless, to better compare and understand the set of modalities we found we are going
to give a canonical construction of a filtered probability spaces from the specification of
a system. Such construction will also help in defining and understanding the semantics
of the logic we are going to develop.
A.1 Transition systems
As customary for modal logics, the semantics of the logical systems we are going to see
is done through Kripke frames [Venema 2008, Chapter 1]. However, in the process logic
literature these are often called ‘transition systems’ (e.g. Huth and Ryan 2004; Stirling
2001; Pnueli 1977).
1In other words, they do not interact with other systems or with the special system usually called ‘environ-
ment’. This is the topic of the growing literature on open systems, which is the core and probably the first
motivation behind applied category theory [Fong 2016; Ghani et al. 2018; Coecke and Duncan 2011; Baez and
Pollard 2017; Clark, Coecke, and Sadrzadeh 2008; Myers 2020].
2The distinction between these two approaches is the subject of the notion bisimilarity. Roughly, two
systems are bisimilar if they have the same behavioural properties. This is formalized as the ability of
simulating each other. See [Venema 2008, Section 1.3] for some results relating bisimilarity and intrinsic
equivalence for modal logics.
3We are not referring to stochastic processes in the mathematical sense, which instead represent observable
properties of an underlying system. For instance, the stock market is a system, which generates a process (e.g.
the prices of a given portfolio), which in turn has observable properties such as the value I extract from it with
an investment strategy, economical indicators, aggregate information, etc. These are stochastic processes in
the traditional sense.
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Definition A.1. A transition system is a set of states S with a transition relation ,
which is a total relation on S.
Remark A.1.1. Usually S is a set of ‘possible worlds’ and is called an ‘accessibility
relation’.
Definition A.2. An (admissible) path in a transition system is an infinite sequence of
transitions
π = s0  s1  s2  · · · .
To denote the suffix of π starting from the i-th entry (included), we write πi. For instance,
π0 = π.
We are going to generalize these devices to include more expressive transition
relations and continuous time. In the process, we will find ourselves surprisingly close
to core topics in stochastic calculus, such as Markov chains and stochastic differential
equations.
Definition A.3. A transition system (S, ) is deterministic if for every state s ∈ S,
there exists a unique s′ ∈ S such that s s′, i.e. if is single-valued.
Deterministic transition systems are equivalent to state machines. Non-deterministic
transition systems can be equipped with a probability labelling and become what is known
as a time-homogeneous Markov chain.
Example A.4. A sequence of coin flips is modelled by the transition system S = {H, T},





Intuitively speaking, a probability labelling should be an assignment P : S× S →
[0, 1] of ‘transition probabilities’ to a (non-deterministic) transition system (S, ) such
that
1. if P(s, s′) > 0, then s s′ holds (we call this an allowed transition),
2. for every state s ∈ S, ∑s′∈S P(s, s′) = 1.
When S is a finite set, such a P amounts to a so-called right stochastic matrix, i.e. a
matrix having non-negative entries and in which each row sums to 1. In the infinite
(uncountable) case, we have to be more clever with our definitions since a plain map
86 APPENDIX A. PROCESS LOGIC AND STOCHASTIC PROCESSES
S× S→ [0, 1] is not good enough for what we are going to do with it downstream in
the construction.
Definition A.5. A probability labelling for a transition system (S, ) is given by:
1. a measurable structure on S, thus a σ-field Σ on S;
2. a Markov kernel S 7→ S.
Notice this structure collapses to the right stochastic matrices we discussed earlier
when S is finite and Σ = P (S), simply because a probability measure on a discrete
space is completely determined by its value on singletons, thus elements of S. Since
this still holds for countable discrete spaces, we see how the general definition is only
needed when S is an uncountable set, like a continuum of states.
Example A.6. Let S = Rn and Σ = B(Rn). We are to describe a deterministic continu-
ous dynamical system (represented by a smooth flow on S) with a non-deterministic
perturbation as a probability labelled transition system on S.
Thus consider a flow Φ = {Φt}t∈R, which is a one-parameter group of diffeomor-
phisms of Rn. This determines a foliation of Rn into flow lines, which are streams along
which points flow according to the action of Φ (a point x0 ∈ Rn moves along the curve
parametrized by t 7→ φt(x0)). This can be described as a transition system by defining
 Φ to be4
x Φ y iff y = Φ1(x).
Notice we are discretizing the flow. This is actually a limit of our description, which is
inherently discrete. A slight improvement is to parametrize the relation on the step size
t > 0:
x Φ,t y iff y = Φt(x).
We’ll discuss later how to overcome this obstacle and work directly with the action Φ.
We now extend this description with a stochastic noise. We want to add a small
probability of jumping from one flow line to another, as if a particle moving along Φ
were subject to random nudges making it wiggle in the current, while still moving with
the flow macroscopically. Observe we cannot keep (Rn, Φ) and just label its transitions
with probabilities, since, as of now, transitions across flow lines are not permitted. We
really need to ‘perturb’ the transitions, in the sense of mathematical physics, that is
4This is a ‘directed’ version of the equivalence relation partitioning Rn into the orbits of the action of Φ.
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define a new relation which is obtained by overlaying a genuinely new disturbance
to the transitions we already have in place. Informally:
 = Φ + ε noise
Formally, this must be specified by a family {Kt}t∈R+ of Markov kernels describing the
exact dynamics of the perturbation. The description of such a kernel comes from the
study of Itô diffusions, which are stochastic processes obeying a stochastic differential
equation (SDE) of a particular form, and can be rather hard. We do not delve into details,
but the interested reader can consult [Grimmett and Stirzaker 2001, Chapter 13].
What matters to us is that under suitable hypothesis on the flow Φ (which is called
the ‘drift’ of the diffusion process) one can solve the equation and get an Rn-valued
process5 (Xt)t∈R+ which describes the evolution of a particle under the situation we
setup. From this solution, one extracts the kernels by setting
Kt : B(Rn)×Rn −→ [0, 1]
(A, x) 7−→ P(Xt ∈ A |X0 = x).
(A.1.1)
Here P is the probability measure on the auxiliary stochastic base one introduced to
solve the aforementioned SDE. It is a fictitious intermediary since one only needs Xt
law (which is, by definition, the measure pushed forward by Xt), and there’s a direct
way to get it through the Feynman–Kac formula. See [Caravenna 2011, Section 7.3].
The previous example gives us a couple of hints/ideas about what we developed so
far:
1. A transition relation is not powerful enough to capture continuous transitions. We
should employ flows instead, aka monoidal actions on the state space. However,
this comes at the cost of losing the ability of specify non-deterministic systems,
which brings us to the next point:
2. Markov kernels are much more expressive than transition relations. With a
Markov kernel we have complete freedom over the determinism of the transitions
plus a way to exactly specify how much and where the non-determinism lies.
Hence we give a more encompassing definition:
Definition A.7. A Markovian action of a monoid (M, 1, ·) on the measurable space
(S, Σ) is a monoidal map Φ : M→ Markov(S, S).
Definition A.8. A stochastic transition system (S, I, K) is a probability space of states
S = (S, Σ, µ) together with a Markovian action K of a time monoid I = (I, 0,+,≤) on S.
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The monoid I is usually N or R+. Its order relation will be useful later on to define
a filtration. The action K : M→ Markov(S, S) is called the transition kernel.
Remark A.8.1. A finer formalization would distinguish the time monoid I, which indexes
the time shifts, from the observed time fragment [a, b] = a ↑ ∩b ↓⊆ I, which indexes the
trajectories.
Remark A.8.2. This notion of transition system is strictly related to time-homogeneous
Markov processes, since every such process determines a stochastic transition system
and viceversa. In fact, from both a time-homogeneous Markov process and a stochastic
transition system we can extract a transition kernel. For the first, such a kernel can
be shown to be a Markovian action, a fact usually ascribed to the so-called Chapman–
Kolmogorov equation, which is exactly the statement KtKs = Kt+s. A minimal framing for
these notions can be found in [Caravenna 2011, Chapter 8].
Example A.9. Example A.6 can be now recast in more conceptual terms. As before,
the state space is Rn with its Borel σ-field. The Markovian action is then given by the
sequence of kernels (A.1.1). As remarked above, the fact such kernels form a Markovian
action is known as the Chapman–Kolmogorov equation. We only need to show K0 is
the identity kernel. But this is trivial given the definition of Kt:
K0(A, x) = P(X0 ∈ A |X0 = x) = δx(A).
Example A.10. Consider the discrete transition system of Example A.4. There S =
{H, T} and Σ = P (S). The Markovian action is given by











Example A.11. Let (S, ) be a transition system, with S finite. Equip S with the
uniform probability measure, and set I = N. Then the relation can be encoded by
the following Markovian action:
K1 : P (S)× S −→ [0, 1]
(B, s) 7−→ 1|{s′ ∈ S | s s′}| ∑s s′
δs′(B).
Kn : P (S)× S −→ [0, 1]
(B, s) 7−→ Kn1 (B, s).
Notice K1 is well-defined since is total, i.e. the set {s′ ∈ S | s s′} is never empty.
Its definition assigns a uniform probability of transitioning from a given s to any other
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state s′ to which we can transition. Kn is then automatically defined since (N, 0,+) is
generated by 1.
Remark A.11.1. The previous construction can be easily generalized to the case S is
countable, by dropping the uniformity of the measures on S and each measure K1(−, s).
A.1.1 The filtered space of trajectories
We now aim to describe a general construction to turn a stochastic transition system
(S, I, K) into a filtered probability space.
The filtered probability space we are going to produce is the space of trajectories of
the system (S, I, K), hence ‘possible paths’ starting from a state s0 ∈ S and following
the stochastic action of K. In practice, we are generalizing and formalizing the way we
constructed, the filtered probability space of the coin flips experiment (Example 2.31).
Construction of the space of trajectories. Trajectories of a system live in the product
space (SI , Σ⊗I). It can be easily equipped with a probability measure thanks to Hahn–
Kolmogorov’s extension (Theorem 2.19), which allows us to define the probability
measure by extension of an assignment the cylinders of SI , which are those subsets of
the form
C = {ω ∈ SI |ωt1 ∈ A1, ωt1+t2 ∈ A2, . . . , ωt1+···+tk ∈ Ak},









where we put A0 = S. In fact, Kti (Ai, s) is the probability of transitioning from s to Ai
within the next ti units of time. Integrating this over Ai−1 we get the probability of
transitioning from a state in Ai−1 to a state in Ai. Multiplying all this probability we get
the probability of evolving through the given sets of states in the given amounts of time.
The initial likelihood of finding the system in an initial state belonging to A0 is given
by the probability distribution of µ. K then moves the probability mass according to the
possible evolutions of the stochastic system. Notice, moreover, that if t1 = 0 then the
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Definition A.12. The space of trajectories of a stochastic transition system (S, I, K)
is the probability space carried by SI together with the product σ-field Σ⊗I and the
probability measure induced by Carathéodory extension of the assignment (A.1.2) to
the whole Σ⊗I .
The space of trajectories is naturally filtered by the order of I, in the following way:
Definition A.13. The canonical filtration of the space of trajectories of a stochastic
transition system (S, I, K) is
Ft := {A× St | A ∈ Σ⊗t↓}.
If I lacks a top element, we forcibly define F∞ := Σ⊗I .
Admissible trajectories. The space SI contains a lot of trajectories the system never
experience. That piece of information, which is contained in K, is reflected in the
probability measure. In fact, if the system at a state s ∈ A ∈ Σ cannot transition in time
t to a state s′ ∈ B ∈ Σ, then
P({ω ∈ SI |ω0 ∈ A, ωt ∈ B}) =
∫
A
Kt(B,−)dµ = 0. (A.1.3)
Nonetheless, it’s handy to define exactly what it means for a specific trajectory ω ∈ SI to
be admissible by the system. In order to do that, we need to assume (S, Σ) is topological,
i.e. Σ = B(S) for some topological structure on S. This is already true when S is finite,
or countable, and equipped with its discrete σ-field, which is the Borel σ-field of its
discrete topology. When S is uncountable, then it’s usually (in meaningful situations
at least) a piece of a manifold, in which case the topological structure was there even
before the measurable structure. Therefore, we do not deem such a requirement to be
too taxing.
In return, we can say the possible transitions (in time t) from a state s ∈ S are given
by the support of Kt(−, s):
Definition A.14 (Ambrosio, Gigli, and Savaré 2008). The support of a measure µ on the
topological measurable space (X,B(X)) is the set
supp µ = {x ∈ X | every open neighbourhood of x has positive measure}.
The support of a measure is the set on which its ‘mass’ is completely concentrated.
For example, a Dirac delta on a point x0 is supported on the singleton {x0}. In the case
of a probability measure, sets outside the support can be considered as really impossible
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events, as opposed to mere sets of zero probability in the support which are possible but
‘extremely diluted’.
Example A.15. When constructing a Markov action from a classical transition system
(S, ) (Example A.11), supp K1(−, s) contains only those states reachable from s in a
single transition:
supp K1(−, s) = {s′ ∈ S | s s′}.
The support supp Kn(−, s) contains only those states reachable from s in exactly n
transitions.
Example A.16. In Example A.6, the supports are trivial: supp Kt(−, x) = Rn for any
t ∈ I, x ∈ Rn. This because the probability mass is spread all over Rn, albeit lumped
around Φtx. Tweaking the diffusion model used to construct K one might as well get
non-trivial supports, e.g. by cutting the ‘tails’ of a Gaussian distribution (and rescaling
suitably).
Thus we can give the following definition:
Definition A.17. A transition from state s ∈ S to state s′ ∈ S is admissible in time t if
s′ ∈ supp Kt(−, s). (A.1.4)
Remark A.17.1. The concept of ‘admissible in time t’ makes it possible to define a family
{ Kt }t∈I of transitions ‘discretizing’ K: for s, s′ ∈ S, we define
s Kt s
′ iff it is admissible to transition from s to s′ in time t.
This family of discretizations is exactly what we encountered when approaching the
diffusion model in Example A.6.
Finally, an admissible trajectory is one in which every transition is possible:
Definition A.18. A trajectory ω ∈ SI is admissible if
ωt  Ks ωt+s, for all s, t ∈ I. (A.1.5)
By the observation we made at the beginning of the paragraph (computation (A.1.3)),
we conclude the set of inadmissible transitions is meager in SI .
‘Nice’ transition systems. The filtered spaces associated to a stochastic transition
system (S, I, K) have wildly different properties depending on the cardinality of S and I.
In this regard, a particularly well-behaved class of stochastic transition systems is given
by the following:
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Definition A.19. A stochastic transition system (S, I, K) is discrete if S is a countable
set and I = (N, 0,+,≤).
They are well-behaved by virtue of a ‘separability’ property: at every finite time,
we can distinguish between trajectories even up to essential equivalence, i.e. a ‘finite
trajectory’ has not zero measure. We now formalize this idea:
Definition A.20. The truncation operator at t ∈ I is the map
trt ω = π−1t↓ πt↓(ω), ω ∈ Ω. (A.1.6)
Its effect is to take a definite trajectory and ‘forget about the future’. Hence it yields
the set of every possible trajectory prolonging ω after t. Truncation is very similar to ♦t,
however, ♦t cannot be used on single trajectories as in most of the cases the singleton
{ω} is meager for P.
Definition A.21. A stochastic transition system (S, I, K) has the singleton property if,
for any admissible trajectory ω ∈ SI ,
P(trt ω) > 0, for all t ∈ I.
Proposition A.22. Let (S, N, K) be a discrete stochastic transition system. Suppose, moreover,
that the singletons of S have positive measure with respect of the probability measure of S. Then
(S, N, K) has the singleton property.
Remark A.22.1 (Future work). The generalized transition systems we defined above
are begging to be recast in the framework of open dynamical systems [Myers 2020].
The improvement we expect from switching to such a language is twofold. First,
we’d get a more conceptual description, which better highlights the modelling as-
sumptions we are making and the role played by the different structures involved.
Second, we expect to achieve a more versatile definition, which might encompass time-
inhomogeneous Markov chains (a task that looks candidly within hand reach) and
perhaps non-Markovian processes as well.
A.1.2 Stopping times for trajectories
Let Ω = (Ω,F∞, {Ft}t∈I , P) be the space of trajectories of the stochastic transition
system (S, I, K).
Definition A.23. A stopping time on Ω is a random variable τ : Ω→ I such that
{τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft, for all t ∈ I.
A.1. TRANSITION SYSTEMS 93
Stopping times are an important tool in stochastic calculus since they provide a
kind of ‘feedback loop’ between a process and the probability space on which it is
defined. This is due to the fact that stopping times are actually ‘times of realizations’ for
certain propositions. The fact they’re ‘adapted’ means one can assess, at each time t ∈ I,
whether the event controlled by τ has happened yet or not.
Moreover, stopping times behave very similar to ‘deterministic’ times (which, by the
way, are themselves stopping time).
Proposition A.24 (Facts about stopping times). Let τ, σ be stopping times on Ω.
1. The random variables τ + σ, τ ∧ σ, τ ∨ σ are stopping times too.
2. The following is a σ-field:
Fτ = {A ∈ F∞ | A ∩ {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft, for all t ∈ I}
3. If τ ≤ σ almost everywhere, then Fτ ⊆ Fσ.
4. If X is a progressively measurable process on Ω and τ is almost surely finite, then Xτ is
a well-defined6 Fτ-measurable random variable.
Proof. See [Caravenna 2011, p. 64].
A common way to define stopping times is indeed to look for the realization of a
proposition ϕ. This proposition can be thought of as an event in F∞, hence as an element
of F∞. As mentioned above, an event at infinity gives two sequences of sets, namely
{t ϕ}t∈I and {♦t ϕ}t∈I , which are ‘adapted’ in the sense that t ϕ,♦t ϕ ∈ Ft for every
t ∈ I. Moreover, they are monotone (one increasing, one decreasing). We are going to
develop some machinery to express facts about the realization of ϕ. We need some care
to make such definitions because the set ϕ is only defined up to essential equivalence.
Proposition A.25. Suppose (S, I, K) has the singleton property, let ϕ ∈ F∞. Then the
following are stopping times:
τϕ(ω) := inf{t ∈ I | trt ω ≤t t ϕ},
τϕ(ω) := sup{t ∈ I | trt ω ≤t ♦t ϕ}.
(A.1.7)
Proof. Since (S, I, K) has the singleton property, every trt ω is an event of positive
probability, thus the definitions of τϕ and τϕ are non-trivial.
6Up to the null set on which τ is infinite, where we could nevertheless set Xτ = C for some arbitrary
constant C in the codomain.
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Let now s ∈ I. Since {t ϕ}t∈I is an increasing sequence of sets, the following is
straightforward:
{τϕ ≤ s} = {ω ∈ Ω | trt ω ≤t t ϕ for some t ≤ s} ≤s s ϕ ∈ Fs.
To prove the other essential inclusion (which then proves {τϕ ≤ s} ∈ Fs), we notice
the following fact: if ω ∈ A ∈ Fs, then trs ω ≤s A. Therefore suppose A ∈ Fs and
A ≤s s ϕ. For every ω ∈ A, one has trs ω ≤s s ϕ by transitive property, hence
A ≤s {τϕ ≤ s}. We conclude s ϕ 's {τϕ ≤ s}, thereby proving the claim.
Conversely, the sequence {♦t ϕ}t∈I is decreasing, but since Fs is closed under com-
plements, the following proves the claim nevertheless:
{τϕ > s} = {ω ∈ Ω | trt ω ≤t ♦t ϕ for all t ≤ s} ≤s ♦s ϕ ∈ Fs.
Again, suppose A ∈ Fs and A ≤s ♦s ϕ, then for every ω ∈ A one has trs ω ≤s ♦s ϕ,
hence trs ω ≤s ♦s ϕ. It follows A ≤s ♦s ϕ, thus {τϕ > s} ' ♦s ϕ and the proof is
done.
Remark A.25.1. In the proof we tacitly used the following fact: if A ∈ Fs, B ∈ Ft
(t ≤ s) and A 't B, then we are able to conclude A ∈ Ft. Indeed, A 't B means
A∆B ∈ ker P ∩ Ft, thus A differs from an event of Ft by a meager set of Ft, which is
again in Ft, and therefore A ∈ Ft.
Remark A.25.2. The stopping time τϕ represents the earliest time at which we can say ϕ
has happened. Dually, τϕ tells the latest time at which we cannot say ϕ hasn’t happened,
or, in other words, the earliest time at which we have a disproof of ϕ.
The other two combinations of inf / sup and /♦ are degenerate: take, for instance
σϕ(ω) := inf{t ∈ I | trt ω ≤t ♦t ϕ}.
This random variable is either 0 or ∞. In fact, since {♦t ϕ}t∈I is a decreasing sequence,
if trt ω ≤t ♦t ϕ for some t then actually trs ω ≤t ♦s ϕ for every s < t, hence σϕ(ω) = 0.
Conversely, if trt ω 6≤t ♦t ϕ for every t ∈ I, then by definition σϕ(ω) = ∞. Analogous
considerations hold for
σϕ(ω) := sup{t ∈ I | trt ω ≤t t ϕ}.
In general, even one among τϕ and τϕ could be degenerate, when the event ϕ cannot
be ‘decided’ with certainty in finite time, or, dually, when ¬ϕ can’t:
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Example A.26. Consider the random experiment of the infinite sequence of coin flips,
as formalized in Example 2.31. Let
ϕ = {we witness less than k heads},
ψ = {we witness more than k heads}.
The event ϕ cannot be assessed in a finite amount of time, since at any given time we
cannot know how many heads we are going to witness in the future. Hence τϕ ≡ ∞,
while τϕ is the time at which we witness the (k + 1)-th head in the sequence. Conversely,
for the event ψ, τψ is trivial (again, constantly ∞), since at no point the sequence we
can exclude that sequence will contain more than k heads. On the other hand, τψ is
non-trivial and gives the time at which we witness the k-th head in the sequence.
Example A.27. Consider a Turing machine with a specific program preloaded. Obvi-
ously, it can be considered as a (discrete) transition system, hence it enjoys the singleton
property. Then statements ϕ about the program which are positively undecidable (i.e.
cannot be confirmed in finite time) give a degenerate τϕ, whereas negatively unde-
cidable ones (i.e. cannot be refuted in finite time, such as halting) give a degenerate
τϕ.
Systems without the singleton property. Even if the singleton property is crucial to
be able to define τϕ and τϕ, it turns out we can still define the associated σ-fields. The
pivotal observation is that
{τϕ ≤ t} 't t ϕ, {τϕ ≤ t} 't ♦t ϕ.
Therefore, given ϕ ∈ F∞ for the space of trajectories of any stochastic transition system
(S, I, K), the following definitions still make sense:
Fτϕ = {A ∈ F∞ | (A ∧t ϕ) ∩ Ft 6= ∅, for all t ∈ I},
Fτϕ = {A ∈ F∞ | (A ∧♦t ϕ) ∩ Ft 6= ∅, for all t ∈ I}.
(A.1.8)
The fact A ∧t ϕ doesn’t determine a specific event in Ft isn’t an issue, by what we
observed in Remark A.25.1.
Modalities associated to stopping times. All in all, the interest we have in stopping
times is that they provide a very expressive set of modalities, induced by the inclusion
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Fτ ⊆ F∞:
♦ϕψ := ♦τϕ ψ = ψ hasn’t been falsified yet by the time ϕ is proved,
ϕψ := τϕ ψ = ψ has already happened by the time ϕ is proved,
♦ϕψ := ♦τϕ ψ = ψ hasn’t been falsified yet by the time ϕ is falsified,
ϕψ := τϕ ψ = ψ has already happened by the time ϕ is falsified.
(A.1.9)
Some evident identities:
Corollary A.27.1. Let ϕ, ψ ∈ F∞. Then we have
τϕ∪ψ = τϕ ∧ τψ, τϕ∩ψ = τϕ ∨ τψ,
from which it follows that
ϕ∪ψ = ϕψ, ♦ϕ∪ψ = ♦ϕ♦ψ. (A.1.10)
A.2 A review of two process logics
A.2.1 CTL∗: Full Computational Tree Logic
Temporal logics were born to help formalizing (and thus check) the behaviour of pro-
grams, especially concurrent ones, in an article of [Pnueli 1977]7. Their syntaxes come
equipped with a set of modal operators to express facts about the temporal realization
of formulae about a process unfolding in time.
The two most common incarnation of temporal logic are LTL (Linear Time Logic) and
CTL (Computational Tree Logic). Both are subsystems of CTL∗, for which we’ll discuss
the semantics. All three flavours of temporal logic are modal logics defined on top of
propositional logic, so they have a common ‘atemporal fragment’.
Atemporal propositions are built inductively by conjunction, disjunction and impli-
cation8, starting from ⊥ (false), > (true) and a set of atomic propositional constants P.
The constants in P stand for specific properties of the system we are actually going to
describe, hence is a ‘parameter’ of the logic (this is what it’s meant by endogenous).
Example A.28. Consider, as a system, the semaphores controlling a road intersection.
Atomic propositions here might be ‘Semaphore 1 is green’, ‘Semaphore 2 is red’, etc.
7Though it was far from the first time logic and time were discussed together. Even Aristotle concerned
himself with the problems of putting logical truth and time together. See [Goranko and Rumberg 2020].
8Negation is defined by abbreviation: ¬ϕ ≡ ϕ→ ⊥.
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Propositions in the atemporal fragment can be thought to refer to the state of the
system at the beginning of its evolution (in mathematical physics lingo, the initial
conditions of the system).
What puts the ‘temporal’ in ‘temporal logic’ is a set of modalities which explicitly
reference time and evolution. Here’s where LTL, CTL and CTL∗ differ.
The main difference between LTL and CTL lies in the ability of quantifying over
paths. In LTL, propositions refer to a single path (or to all paths, for what matters),
whereas CTL and CTL∗ have quantifiers explicitly referring to multiple possible paths:
that’s why CTL and CTL∗ are called branching time logics, as opposed to LTL which is a
linear time logic.
Therefore CTL and CTL∗ are suitable for non-deterministic systems. On the other
hand, model checking for CTL(∗) is much more difficult—computationally speaking—
so one might want to stick with LTL as much as possible when describing a real-life
scenario. See [Huth and Ryan 2004, Section 3.6], [Huth and Ryan 2004, Remark 3.19] for
some insights on the pros and cons of each flavour.
Since CTL∗ encompasses both LTL and CTL, and strictly so, we are going to describe
its set of modalities and its semantics, and then we’ll point out which fragments corre-
spond to LTL and CTL. For this part we refer to [Emerson and Halpern 1983], where
CTL∗ was first introduced.
Formulae of CTL∗ are best introduced in a mutually recursive fashion by defining
two ‘kinds’ of formulae:
1. State formulae are all atemporal formulae and all quantified path formulae: if ϕ is
a path formula, then
Aϕ for all paths ϕ holds in every path
starting from the current state.
Eϕ for some paths ϕ holds in at least one path
starting from the current state
are state formulae
2. Path formulae are all state formulae, conjunctions, disjunctions and implications
of path formulae and, for ϕ, ψ path formulae:
Xϕ next ϕ will be true in the next state.
ψUϕ until ψ is true until ϕ becomes true,
and this happens sometime in the future.
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are path formulae.
Notice the separation between path and state formulae is really just a way to present
them, since in the end all formulae are path formulae. Also the distinction is conceptual,
and deemed important by the inventors of CTL∗ [Emerson and Halpern 1983, p. 131].
That said, we stressed this fact since the semantics of these two classes of formulae is
apparently different, while in reality everything can be expressed in terms of paths.
In addition to the temporal modalities we have defined, it is customary to add the
following, which are defined in terms of the first ones9:
Fϕ ≡ >Uϕ future ϕ will be true sometime in the future.
Gϕ ≡ ¬F¬ϕ globally ϕ will always be true from now on.
ψWϕ ≡ ψUϕ ∨ Gψ weak until ψ is true until ϕ becomes true.
ψRϕ ≡ ¬(¬ψU¬ϕ) release ϕ remains true up to the moment ψ becomes true,
and this happens sometime in the future.
We then deduce the following useful identities [Huth and Ryan 2004, p. 184],
[Reynolds 2001]. Here ϕ = ψ means ϕ and ψ are equisatisfiable (in the sense of the |=
relation defined later):
¬Gϕ = F¬ϕ, ¬Xϕ = X¬ϕ,
G(ϕ ∧ ψ) = Gϕ ∧ Gψ, F(ϕ ∨ ψ) = Fϕ ∨ Fψ,
Fϕ = >Uϕ, Gϕ = ⊥Rϕ,
ψUϕ = ψWϕ ∧ Fψ, ψWϕ = ψUϕ ∨ Gϕ,
ψWϕ = ϕR(ϕ ∨ ψ), ψRϕ = ϕW(ϕ ∧ ψ).
(A.2.1)
In light of these relations, it should be evident the choice of the ‘primary’ modalities
(we chose X, F, U) and the ‘derived’ ones is not unique.
Finally, a formula in CTL∗ is an LTL formula if it doesn’t use the E modality; whereas
it is a CTL formula is any path formula which is generated from state formulae using
U and X only (hence no top level logical connectives, or negations, and U and X are
applied just to state formulae).
9A pedant sed obligatory sidenote: in formulae, modal operators bind stronger than logical connectives,
and unary operators bind stronger than binary ones.
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A.2.1.1 Classical semantics
Definition A.29 (Reynolds 2001). A model for CTL∗ is a transition system (S, ) to-
gether with a labelling function L : P → P (S), where P is the set of system-specific
atomic propositions we mentioned earlier. One defines inductively what it means for a
path π = s0  s1  · · · to satisfy a CTL∗ formula:
1. M, π |= >,
2. M, π 6|= ⊥,
3. for each atomic proposition p ∈ P, M, π |= p iff s0 ∈ L(p),
4. M, π |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, π |= ϕ and M, π |= ψ,
5. M, π |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, π |= ϕ or M, π |= ψ,
6. M, π |= ϕ→ ψ iff M, π |= ψ whenever M, π |= ϕ,
7. M, π |= Aϕ iff for every path π′ = s0  · · · , where s0 is the first state of π,
M, π′ |= ϕ,
8. M, π |= Eϕ iff there exists a path π′ = s0  · · · , where s0 is the first state of π,
such that M, π′ |= ϕ,
9. M, π |= ψUϕ iff there is some i ≥ 1 such that M, πi |= ψ and for all j = 1, . . . , i− 1
we have M, π j |= ϕ,
10. M, π |= Xϕ iff M, π1 |= ϕ.
A.2.2 PDL: Propositional Dynamic Logic
Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL), is the exogenous companion of temporal logic. It
is more similar to an abstract programming language than a logical system, since it
codifies in its syntax all the necessary constructs to build the systems it talks about,
namely (computer) programs. See [Harel, Kozen, and Tiuryn 2001] for a full elementary
treatment of PDL.
In PDL there are two kinds of syntactic objects, formulae and programs. Both are
defined by mutual recursion starting from a set of atomic propositions P (including >,
⊥) and a set of atomic programs A. If α and β are programs and ϕ, ψ are formulae, then
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ϕ→ ψ implication
⊥ false
〈α〉ϕ program possibility if α halts when started in the current
state, then it may do so in a state where
ϕ holds.
are formulae and
α; β sequential composition execute α from the current state, then
when it halts execute β from the last
state of α.
α ∪ β choice execute either of α or β.
α∗ iteration execute α an arbitrary but finite number
of times.
ϕ? test do nothing if ϕ holds, hang if it doesn’t.
are programs.
Moreover, the following abbreviations are introduced
skip := 1? skip do nothing.
fail := 0? fail hang (never halt).
[α]ϕ := ¬〈α〉¬ϕ program necessity if α halts when started in
the current state, then
it does so in a state
in which ϕ holds.
if ϕ then α else β := ϕ?; α
⋃¬ϕ?; β conditional choice if ϕ holds execute α, else β.
while α do β := (ϕ?; α)∗;¬ϕ? conditional iteration iterate α as long as ϕ holds.
Remark A.29.1. We adopt the convention under which unary operators bind tighter than
binary ones and ; binds tighter than ∪. Moreover, in light of the semantics we are about
to give, both ; and ∪ are deemed associative.
A.2.2.1 Classical semantics
The semantics of PDL we are going to lay down is denotational, meaning we are going
to construct some mathematical objects which represent the intended effect of programs.
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Formally, the semantics of PDL uses again a family of labelled transition systems
(S, { a}a∈A, L)
parametrized by the atomic programs, each analogous to what we have defined for
temporal logics.
Then formulae are interpreted as subsets of S (corresponding to ‘those states on
which they hold’), while programs are interpreted as relations in S (corresponding
to the input-output relations they encode). The interpretation will be compositional,
meaning the interpretation of compound formulae and programs is built from that of
their components.
In other words, the interpretation is going to be inductively defined on the structure
of both programs and formulae. Thus the family { a}a∈A and the labelling L : P →
P (S) provide the ‘base cases’ of such induction.
Remark A.29.2. Below, ◦ denotes relational composition: if R ⊆ H × G and T ⊆ G× K,
then T ◦ R ⊆ H × K is defined as
h T ◦ R k iff there exists g ∈ G such that hRg and gTk.
Notice a subset R ⊆ H is equivalent to a relation R ⊆ H × 1. That’s how one should
interpret the composition of a relation and a subset in the following definition.
Definition A.30 (Harel, Kozen, and Tiuryn 2001, p. 116). A model of PDL (with set of
atomic propositions P and set of atomic programs A) is a family of labelled transition
systems M = (S, { a}a∈A, L). The interpretation of formulae and programs in M is
defined inductively:
1. ‖⊥‖M := ∅,
2. ‖p‖M := L(p) for any atomic formula p ∈ P,
3. ‖a‖M := a for any atomic program a ∈ A,
4. ‖ϕ→ ψ‖M = ‖ϕ‖CM ∪ ‖ψ‖M,
5. ‖〈α〉ϕ‖M := ‖α‖M ◦ ‖ϕ‖M,
6. ‖α; β‖M := ‖α‖M ◦ ‖β‖M,
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9. ‖ϕ?‖M := ∆S‖ϕ‖M.
Remark A.30.1. The interpretation of ‖α∗‖M is also known as the reflexive, transitive
closure of ‖α‖M, while the interpretation of ‖ϕ?‖M is more explicitly given as {(s, s) | s ∈
‖ϕ‖M}.
Remark A.30.2. Even if all the atomic programs are deterministic, the interpretations of
∪ and .∗ are non-deterministic relations. In fact,
s ‖α ∪ β‖M s′ iff executing α or β on s gets us to s′,
s ‖α∗‖M s′ iff we can execute α on s some finite number of times and get to s′.
Remark A.30.3. We remark the semantics of a non-halting program is ∅. In particular,
if α is an atomic program which doesn’t halt on a state s ∈ S, then s ‖α‖M s′ is not
defined for any state s′. Moreover, relational composition has ∅ as absorbing element.
This means two things: first of all, if α does not terminate on state s, so does α; β for
any other program β. Secondly, when interpreting a program containing either ∪ or .∗
(the ‘indeterminate’ operators), the semantics automatically prunes away non-halting
execution paths in favour of halting ones.
Example A.31. To exemplify the last sentence, we analyze the meaning of while ϕ do α:
‖while ϕ do α‖M = ‖(ϕ?; α)∗;¬ϕ?‖M













We do not unwind the definition beyond this point, pain it would get too unwieldy to
understand. Let’s analyze what we got.
The first term is the reflexive, transitive closure of ∆S‖ϕ‖M ◦ ‖α‖M. This relation
represent the program that fails on a state s ∈ S if ϕ isn’t true for s, or if α doesn’t
terminate on s. Hence to repeat this program n times means to alternatively check ϕ
against a state, then execute α, then check ϕ again on the result, and so on. Starting from
a state s, there are two ways by which this can fail: either (1) ϕ stops being valid after a
finite number of iterations, or (2) after a finite number of iterations I get to a state on
which α doesn’t terminate.
We can avoid (1) by iterating less. The number of iterations is arbitrary, which
denotationally correspond to the fact that if iterating too much on s brings me to a
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non-halting state then simply this state won’t be related to s in the transitive closure of
∆S‖ϕ‖M ◦ ‖α‖M. Let’s look at the second fragment. This doesn’t terminate on the states
which satisfy ϕ. Hence, composed with the previous, prunes out all the ‘execution paths’
in which we didn’t iterate enough times and so we executed ¬ϕ? while ϕ was still true.
Eventually, the program will terminate on a state s iff α halts on s (avoiding (2)), and the
resulting state will be the one we get by repeating α the least number of times before ϕ
stops being valid (possibly 0).
This is precisely the denotational semantics of a while loop.
A.3 Semantics in stochastic transition systems?
We were not able to find a semantics of CTL∗ in a stochastic transition system (S, I, K),
if not ‘trivially’, i.e. by merely reproducing the semantics in the discrete case.
In particular we were not able to use the filtration modalities to define the temporal
operator of CTL∗. Perhaps the only exception is given by A and E, which appear to be
captured by 0 and ♦0, respectively.
The modalities (A.1.9) arising from ‘realizing times’ of a proposition ψ were a promis-
ing candidate to capture the meaning of W or U. Unfortunately, this is yet again not the
case. In fact suppose we defined
‖ψWϕ‖ := ‖ψ‖‖ϕ‖,
as suggested by the ‘interpretation’ given toψ in (A.1.9). Then, by the identities (A.2.1),
one would obtain
‖ψRϕ‖ = ‖ϕW(ϕ ∧ ψ)‖ = ‖ϕ‖‖ϕ ∧ ψ‖,
‖ψUϕ‖ = ‖¬(¬ψR¬ϕ)‖ = ♦‖¬ϕ‖‖ϕ ∨ ψ‖,
‖Fϕ‖ = ‖>Uϕ‖ = ♦‖¬ϕ‖‖>‖,
‖Gϕ‖ = ‖⊥Rϕ‖ = ‖ϕ‖‖⊥‖.
However, the only reasonable definitions for ‖⊥‖ and ‖>‖ are ∅ and SI , respectively,
which would entail Fϕ and Gϕ are always interpreted to SI and ∅, respectively.
The crux of the problem seems to be in the fact the modal framework of the modalities
doesn’t allow one to start evaluating a proposition at an arbitrary suffix of a path, as
required by F, for instance. The proposition is either true from the beginning or never
true.
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The semantics for PDL is disappointing too. By defining sSIK = (S, { Kt }t∈I , Σ ↪→
P (S)), one gets a a model of PDL(Σ, I), i.e. PDL where the set of atomic propositions is
Σ and the set of atomic programs is I.
We recall the transitions { Kt }t∈I have been defined in Remark A.17.1 as the ‘discrete’
version of K. It’s actually nice to observe the programs t; s and t + s have the same
interpretation in the model, by virtue of the fact K is a monoidal action, hence
‖t; s‖sSIK = Kt ◦ Ks = Kt+s = ‖t + s‖sSIK.
On the other hand, the modalities [t] and 〈t〉 do not correspond to the filtration modali-
ties t and ♦t: this is easy to see since
[t][s]ϕ = [t; s]ϕ = [t + s]ϕ
while
ts ϕ = t∧s ϕ.
as observed in (5.1.6).
Maybe this is obvious, since we are interpreting PDL on states, while the filtration
modalities act on paths. Indeed, one might define the following shift relations:
ω +Kt ω
′ iff for every s ∈ I, ω′s+t = ωs




) is a model of PDL(Σ⊗I , I), i.e.
PDL where the set of atomic propositions is Σ⊗I and the set of atomic programs is I. As
before, one has t; s = t + s as programs, and thus the filtration modalities do not show
up.
These results are disappointing, yet some future research questions remain open:
Question 4.
1. Are stochastic transition systems suitable for a generalized Kripke semantics nevertheless?
Perhaps in their ‘open form’ (Remark A.22.1).
2. Are there systems in process logics which capture the semantics of the modal operators
♦t a t? We have the feeling one may have to look at either epistemic logic [Rendsvig
and Symons 2019], which is used to speak about the knowledge and beliefs of various
agents; or define a new polymodal logic10 altogether.
3. Could we need to generalize semantics even more? For example, probabilistic semantics
might be relevant, see [Feldman and Harel 1984].
10Indeed, this fragment of µ-calculus is trivially captured by filtration modalities, see [Venema 2008].
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4. Can process logics provide an original perspective and useful insights in the study of
stochastic calculus, or, more generally, stochastic dynamical systems?
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